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Executive Summary
Can low income people save in a program of matched savings called individual development
accounts (IDAs)?  The data in this monitoring report indicate that IDA participants can save.
Including all dropouts, they save an average of $33 per month and $0.71 of every dollar that
could be saved and matched.  Especially noteworthy, very poor IDA participants save almost as
much as other participants, and save a much larger portion of their income.
American Dream Demonstration
The “American Dream Demonstration” (ADD) is a nationwide demonstration of IDAs.  ADD is
scheduled to run for four years (1997-2001), with an additional two years of evaluation (until
2003).  A projected 2,000 people will have IDAs at 14 programs1 around the country.  In terms
of scope and resources, ADD may be the largest policy demonstration in the country at the
present time.
The Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED) in Washington, DC has designed and is
guiding ADD.  The Center for Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. Louis
has designed the evaluation.
The evaluation of ADD is the first major study of IDAs.  Downpayments on the American
Dream Policy Demonstration, Startup Evaluation Report (Sherraden et al., 1999), covered the
initial start-up period of ADD through June 30, 1998.  This report includes information on IDA
programs, participants, and saving patterns through June 30, 1999.  Two more annual monitoring
reports are planned, covering the periods through June 30, 2000, and June 30, 2001.
The data for this report come from the Management Information System for Individual
Development Accounts (MIS IDA), a software package and monitoring tool created and
supported by CSD.  MIS IDA is a program-administered data-collection instrument.  Among
other things, MIS IDA provides management tools such as account statements and reports and
generates a comprehensive database with information on program characteristics, participant
characteristics, and enrollment, savings, and withdrawals.
For this report, CSD has merged MIS IDA data from all 14 programs into a single data set.  We
describe program characteristics; participant characteristics; patterns of enrollment, savings, and
withdrawals; and saving outcomes for these 14 programs as a whole (in Appendix A we present
data separately for each program).  Then we examine program and participant characteristics that
are associated with saving outcomes.
Program Characteristics
All 14 IDA programs are run by private, not-for-profit organizations.  Six are housed in
community development organizations, and the remaining programs are evenly split among
                                                          
1  One sponsoring organization, the Community Action Project of Tulsa County, has two IDA programs.  Therefore,
in future chapters of this report, we describe and refer to 14 “IDA programs” but 13 “sponsoring organizations.”
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social service agencies, banks or credit unions, housing development organizations, and
organizational collaboratives.
In all 14 programs, participants earn interest on their IDA balances and receive monthly account
statements.  Nine programs offer a single match rate to all participants; five offer varied match
rates, depending on IDA use and/or participant economic status.  Overall, match rates range from
1:1 to 7:1.  The most common is 2:1.
All programs allow participants to use their IDAs for home purchase, microenterprise
development, and education.  More than half also allow participants to use matching funds for
job training or for home repair.  About half of the programs have a waiting period before
participants may make a withdrawal.  Nine programs report having penalties for unapproved
withdrawals.
Participant Characteristics
As of June 30, 1999, there were 1,326 ADD participants.  A participant is defined as someone
who is or has been enrolled in an IDA program and who has at least one account statement
recorded in MIS IDA.  ADD participants are primarily female (78%), urban residents (84%), and
20-50 years old (86%).  About 41% are Caucasian, 40% are African-American, 12% are Latino,
2% are Asian or Pacific Islander, and 2% are Native-American.  Just under half are single
(never-married), 24% are married, and 30% are divorced, separated, or widowed.
More than 90% of ADD participants live in households with incomes below 200% of the poverty
line, and about 43% are below the poverty line.  About 15% have not completed high school,
27% have a high school degree, 38% attended some college, and 20% have a college degree.
Almost 60% are employed full-time, 25% are employed part-time, and 11% are involuntarily
unemployed.  Eighty percent have a checking or savings account.
Compared to the U.S. population below 200% of the poverty line, ADD participants are more
likely to be female, African-American, and never-married.  ADD participants are also more
likely to have attended college or to have a college degree and less likely to have dropped out of
high school.  Finally, ADD participants are more likely to already have a bank account and more
likely to be employed.  Thus, compared to non-participants with similar income, ADD
participants are more likely to be disadvantaged in terms of gender, ethnicity, and marital status,
but less likely to be disadvantaged in terms of education, employment status, and use of banks.
The targeting of most ADD programs to the “working poor” explains the higher level of
employment, and is probably related to the higher level of education and being “banked.”
Enrollment, Saving, and Withdrawals
All savings data in this report are based on bank records.  Thus, the MIS IDA data on both
numbers of participants and amounts of saving are, as social research goes, quite reliable and
trustworthy.
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The reader should bear in mind that this report is based on at most two years of IDA program
operation (due to time for program start-up, the median length of operation as of June 30, 1999,
is 15 months), and most participants have been in the IDA program for less than one year (the
median length of participation is 9 months).  With greater experience in IDAs, outcomes are
likely to change in ways that we cannot predict at this time.
Enrollment in ADD began rather slowly, with 4 enrollees between July and September 1997.
After one year, enrollment was running at over 200 per quarter, a level roughly maintained
through June 30, 1999.  The typical experience at ADD programs is of slow start-up and then
rapidly rising enrollment as people begin to understand and trust the program.  ADD program
sponsors no longer talk about recruitment as a major challenge.
As of June 30, 1999, participant savings totaled $378,708.  Matching funds for these savings
were $741,609, about twice the participant savings amount, reflecting the typical match rate of
2:1.  Total IDA accumulation (participant savings plus match) was $1,120, 317.
Ninety-two ADD participants had made matched withdrawals by June 30, 1999, and these
matched withdrawals totaled $149,339.  Participants used matched withdrawals for
microenterprise (33%), home purchase (27%), home repair (20%), and education (20%).  This
pattern is different from the overall intended uses of IDAs; 55% of participants intend home
purchase, 17% intend post-secondary education, and 17% intend microenterprise.  These
intended uses are shaped in part by the nature of the organizations in ADD.  We believe early
withdrawals for microenterprise are common because small sums may be used for small
businesses, whereas larger amounts are usually required for home purchases.
Saving Outcomes
In this report, we create a number of saving outcome measures.  No single measure of saving
tells us all that we want to know, but together, the measures describe different aspects of how
people save.  The measures address the amount of accumulated savings, the regularity (in time
and in amount) of deposits, and the closeness of actual saving behavior to the savings goals of
the program.  Key measures are:
Participant savings.  Participant savings is defined as all deposits and interest minus
unapproved withdrawals.  The savings match is not included.  This measure does not account for
the length of participation, for the timing of deposits or withdrawals, nor for different savings
goals among participants or programs.  Participant savings varies quite a lot by IDA program
because different programs have different savings goals and expectations, and because programs
started at different times.  Across all programs, the median participant in ADD had savings of
$181; the mean was $286; and the largest amount of savings was $2,253.
Average monthly deposit.  Average monthly deposit is defined as participant savings divided by
the number of months of participation.  Unlike participant savings, average monthly deposit does
control for the length of time that a participant has had the opportunity to save.  Across all
programs, the median average monthly deposit was $23 and the mean was $33.
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Deposit regularity.  Deposit regularity is defined as the number of months with a deposit
divided by the number of months in which a deposit was possible.  Deposit regularity indicates
to what extent participants save steadily through time.  For the purpose of this measure, deposits
of accrued interest are not counted as deposits.  Across all programs, deposit regularity has a
median value of 0.7, indicating that the typical IDA participant made a deposit in seven out of
every ten months.  It is important to note that this is active saving, without benefit of automatic
payroll deductions.
Proportion of savings goal.  The proportion of savings goal is defined as the ratio of the
average monthly deposit to the monthly savings goal.  The monthly savings goal is taken as one-
twelfth of the annual amount eligible for a match, as set by the program.  Thus the proportion of
savings goal indicates the closeness of actual savings behavior to the behavior that would take
full advantage of the incentives offered by the program.  Overall, the median value is 0.59.  In
other words, the typical IDA participant saved $0.59 for every dollar she could save and have
matched.  The mean value is 0.71, indicating that ADD participants together saved $0.71 of
every dollar that they could save and have matched.  These figures include the 107 participants
(8%) who are “dropouts” and have saved little or nothing.  Thus, the savings performance of
most ADD participants is strong.
Overall, saving outcomes in ADD are quite positive.  Participants, including “dropouts,” have
saved an average of $33 per month and accumulated an average of $286.  With matching funds,
the average accumulation is $845 over an average of nine months of participation.
While we are not able at this time to say whether participants have shifted other assets into IDAs,
this seems unlikely for most participants given their low levels of non-IDA assets (median
checking account balance of $35, and median savings account balance of $2), nor is there a
statistical relationship between level of non-IDA assets and savings performance.
Program Characteristics and Saving Outcomes
Next, we identify program characteristics that seem to be associated with saving outcomes.  We
do not want to overinterpret the findings regarding program characteristics and saving outcomes,
largely because we have only 14 IDA programs.  Still, we would like to highlight key findings.
These observations come from multivariate analysis, controlling for participant characteristics:
• The age (and presumably experience) of the sponsoring organization is positively associated
with participant savings and proportion of savings goal over time.  Age of organization is
also positively associated with deposit regularity.  The age (and presumably experience) of
the IDA program has very similar effects on saving outcomes as age of organization.
Overall, there is a strong indication that age and experience matter at both the organizational
and program level.
• The average monthly deposit goal appears to have a positive impact on participant savings
and average monthly deposit, but a negative impact on proportion of savings goal and
proportion of savings goal over time.  In other words, when programs set a high goal for
savings, it increases savings, but participants also tend to fall short of the higher savings goal.
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• The proportion of IDA participants who had an affiliation with the sponsoring organization
prior to the IDA program has consistent positive associations with saving outcomes, except
for deposit lumpiness, where the association is negative.  Overall, there is a strong indication
that relationships with participants matter a great deal on saving performance.
Participant Characteristics and Saving Outcomes
Next, we identify participant characteristics that seem to be associated with saving outcomes.
These observations come from multivariate analyses that include program characteristics as well
as participant characteristics.  These relationships can be described with a much higher degree of
confidence than results related to program characteristics because we have more than 1,100
participants.  Key results are as follows:
• Older participants save more and more regularly.  This finding is generally expected.
• Race/ethnicity is related to savings.  African-Americans save smaller amounts than
Caucasians.  This finding is of concern and more investigation is needed.  However,
despite the lower savings of African-Americans, it is important to note that they still save
an average of $28 per month.
• The effects of education are large.  Compared to college graduates, other IDA participants
save less.  Those who have not completed high school save much less.
• Income does not have a statistically significant effect on the amount of savings.
• Consistent with the above, very income-poor households save in IDAs at a higher rate than
less income-poor households.  Households with income at half the poverty line or below
save, on average, 8% of their income in IDAs.  Households with incomes of 150% of
poverty or more save about 2% of their incomes in IDAs.
This last finding is consistent with an institutional theory of saving, wherein it is the
characteristics of the IDA program itself more than individual characteristics (even income) that
have the strongest effects on saving.  In IDA programs, the expectation of a certain amount of
matchable savings, along with other program characteristics, appears to shape saving behavior
very strongly.
These early results from ADD will surely raise questions and generate debate.  This discussion
and future research, in ADD and elsewhere, will hopefully enable us to learn more about the
potential of asset building policy and programs for the poor.
Reference
Sherraden, M., Page-Adams, D., & Johnson, L. (1999).  Downpayments on the American Dream
Policy Demonstration, Startup Evaluation Report.  St. Louis: Center for Social
Development, Washington University.
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1.  Can the Poor Save? Theory, Evidence, and Questions
This chapter describes existing theories of saving and asset accumulation, argues that institutions
have a profound impact on saving-related behaviors and outcomes, and identifies many
mechanisms through which IDAs might increase saving and asset accumulation.1  First, it is
important to define saving, assets, and asset accumulation.  According to conventional
definitions, saving occurs when an individual foregoes current consumption in order to have
greater consumption in the future.  Thus, saving refers to a flow of economic resources.  Assets
are stocks of economic resources, and asset accumulation refers to increases in wealth over time.
It is important to note that individuals may save without experiencing observable asset
accumulation, if they frequently withdraw money from savings.  This distinction actually reflects
measurement error: If asset levels were recorded more frequently, we would observe short-term
asset accumulation.  Since this type of measurement error is inevitable, we are interested in both
saving and asset accumulation.  Saving is important, because it indicates that individuals are able
and willing to postpone consumption, even if assets are quickly depleted.  Asset accumulation is
important because stocks of economic resources enable individuals to meet life-cycle needs,
cope with emergencies, and acquire other productive assets (Rutherford, 1999).  In addition, if
Sherraden (1990, 1991) is correct, asset holding has additional benefits beyond increased
opportunities for consumption.
Individuals may save in different ways and accumulate different types of assets.  For example,
they may store tangible goods, they may invest in human capital, or they may loan money or in-
kind resources to social network members.  In this report, we are primarily interested in financial
and physical assets (particularly the value of owner-occupied housing).2  Empirical evidence
clearly indicates that higher-income households save a larger portion of their incomes, and
accumulate greater wealth, than lower-income households.  In fact, most lower-income
households have very low (even negative) saving rates and very limited (again, often negative)
asset accumulation (Bernheim & Scholz, 1993; Bunting, 1991; Carney & Gale, forthcoming;
Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1994a, Table 2).  For the reasons noted above, it is important to
explain these patterns of saving and asset accumulation.  The following section summarizes the
key assumptions and propositions of existing theories of saving and asset accumulation.
Existing Theories of Saving and Asset Accumulation
Existing theories of saving and asset accumulation, which are actually at various stages of
theoretical development, may be classified into three categories: (1) neoclassical economic, (2)
psychological and sociological, and (3) behavioral.
                                                
1 This chapter is based in part on Beverly, S. G., & Sherraden, M. (1999).
2 These assets are relatively easy to value.  Also, in industrialized countries, most measures and most of the existing
theories of saving and asset accumulation emphasize financial assets and the value of owner-occupied housing.
However, by excluding other types of assets, we necessarily underestimate the extent of saving in low-income, low-
wealth households.
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Neoclassical Economic Theories
Neoclassical economic models assume that individuals are rational beings who respond in
predictable ways to changes in incentives.  From this perspective, there are two broad
determinants of individual behavior: opportunities (or constraints) and individual preferences
(Pollak, 1998).  Preferences are generally assumed to be stable and exogenous.  Many economic
models also assume that individuals have perfect knowledge and access to perfect markets.  With
regard to theories of saving and asset accumulation, it is important to note that individual utility
(i.e., happiness or satisfaction) is assumed to be a function of consumption.  Therefore, economic
models generally treat saving as a residual, resources that are left over after consumption
decisions have been made.
The two most well-known neoclassical theories of saving are the life cycle hypothesis (Ando &
Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando, 1957; Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954), and the permanent
income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957).  Both of these theories assume that individuals and
households are concerned about long-term consumption opportunities and therefore explain
saving and consumption in terms of expected future income.  Proponents of these models view
saving as a way to “smooth” consumption in the face of income fluctuations.  Since consumption
is determined by anticipated lifetime resources (rather than current resources), saving over short
periods of time (e.g., a year) is expected to reflect departures of current income from average
lifetime resources.  In other words, according to these theories, when current income falls below
average expected lifetime income, saving decreases, and individuals and households may even
borrow to finance consumption.  When current income exceeds average expected lifetime
resources, individuals and households save.
As its name suggests, the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) posits that consumption and saving reflect
an individual’s stage in the life cycle, which is generally proxied by age.  Since retirement, for
most people, is the most substantial and enduring “income fluctuation,” this model emphasizes
saving for retirement as a primary motivation for deferred consumption.3  Young households are
expected to have negative saving since they typically have relatively low earnings and incur debt
for education, the purchase of homes, and other expenses.  In the middle-age, saving is expected
to be positive because individuals pay their debts and begin to save for retirement.  Upon
retirement, dissaving is expected to occur.  Thus, differences in consumption and saving among
households are believed to be partly the product of age differences, and the pattern of saving and
dissaving creates an inverted U-shaped pattern (“hump saving,” according to Harrod, 1948)
across age categories and/or over time (Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando, 1957;
Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954).
Like the life cycle hypothesis, the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) assumes that long-term
income is the primary determinant of consumption.  In this model, permanent income refers to
the present value of lifetime income, and transitory income refers to the difference between
current income and permanent income.  Friedman (1957) claims that consumption will respond
to changes in permanent but not transitory income.  In other words, when an individual
                                                
3 More complex LCH models also consider as possible saving motives the desire to leave a bequest (e.g., Hurd &
Mundaca, 1989; Menchik & David, 1983) and the desire to prepare for emergencies (e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, &
Zeldes, 1994a, 1994b, 1995).
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experiences an increase in income that she perceives as temporary, she is expected to save, rather
than consume, this money.  If she perceives the increase to be permanent, she is expected to raise
her consumption standards.4  Observed differences in household saving and consumption are
believed to reflect, in part, differences in the relative shares of transitory and permanent income.
In recent years, a small number of economists have proposed alternatives to the LCH and PIH,
the so-called “buffer-stock” models of saving (e.g., Carroll, 1997; Carroll & Samwick, 1997;
Deaton, 1991).  These models emphasize a precautionary motive for saving, particularly for
younger households and for households facing greater income uncertainty.  These households are
expected to accumulate small stocks of assets (“buffer stocks”) to smooth consumption in the
face of short-term income fluctuations and liquidity constraints.  The pattern of asset
accumulation predicted by buffer-stock models is very different than the inverted U-shape
predicted by the LCH: Wealth is expected to remain fairly constant (assuming that households
have accumulated and can maintain their optimal buffer stocks) until about age 50 when
households begin saving for retirement (see, e.g., Carroll & Samwick, 1997, Figure 3).
Psychological and Sociological Theories
Psychological and sociological theories of saving posit that the effects of external stimuli on
economic behavior are conditioned by intervening variables such as motives, aspirations, and
expectations (Katona, 1975; Olander & Seipel, 1970; Strumpel, 1972, 1975; Van Raaij, 1989).
However, unlike neoclassical economic theories, these theories do not assume that preferences
and aspirations are fixed.  In fact, psychological and sociological theories of saving explicitly
seek to explain saving-related preferences, aspirations, and expectations.
The most well-known economic psychologist, George Katona (1951, 1975), has noted that
saving is a function of two sets of factors, ability to save and willingness to save.  The emphasis
on ability to save acknowledges that some individuals, because of limited economic resources or
special consumption needs, find it more difficult to defer consumption than others.  At the same
time, those individuals who can postpone consumption still must choose to do so, a decision that
requires some degree of willpower.  In particular, Katona claims that “consumer sentiment” (i.e.,
the evaluation and expectations people have regarding the economic circumstances of the nation
and their own households) determines households’ willingness to save.  For example, households
are expected to postpone consumption and save for future security if their perceptions of
household finances, interest rates, unemployment, inflation, and so forth are pessimistic.  Other
psychological and sociological propositions consider the effects of families (Cohen, 1994), peers
(Duesenberry, 1949), and past saving experiences (Furnham, 1985; Katona, 1975) on
consumption patterns, saving-related beliefs, and aspirations for saving.
Behavioral Theories
Finally, in addition to economic, psychological, and sociological theories, there are a few
behavioral theories of saving.  Although these theories are partly rooted in economics, they
modify conventional economic models in two important ways.  First, behavioral theories do not
                                                
4 In its strongest form, the PIH posits that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory income is
zero.  Other forms of the PIH suggest that the MPC out of transitory income will be low but greater than zero.
Saving Patterns in IDA Programs   4
Center for Social Development
Washington University
assume that income and wealth are perfectly fungible.  Instead, Shefrin and Thaler (1988;  see
also Thaler, 1990, 1994) propose that individuals use systems of mental accounts and that the
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) varies across accounts.  For example, individuals may
code resources as current income, current assets, or future income.  The MPC from current
income is expected to be close to one, the MPC from future income is expected to be close to
zero, and the MPC from current assets is expected to be somewhere in between.
Second, behavioral theories do not assume that individuals have perfect knowledge or behave in
perfectly rational ways.  Instead, these theories emphasize that individuals sometimes have
trouble resisting temptations to spend.  Therefore, individuals may benefit from creating their
own behavioral incentives and constraints (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1994).  These rules
may be externally imposed, although individuals voluntarily place themselves under these
restrictions (e.g., a Christmas saving account), or self-imposed (e.g., “rules-of-thumb,” such as
avoiding borrowing or restricting borrowing to specific purchases).  With these rules in mind,
household saving is seen as “the result of the successful and sophisticated imposition of welfare-
improving, self-imposed constraints on spending” (Maital & Maital, 1994, p. 7).
Behavioral theories imply that saving and asset accumulation are likely to increase when
mechanisms of contractual saving (see Katona, 1975, pp. 230-233) or precommitment constraints
are available.  These mechanisms make it difficult to choose current pleasure at the expense of
future pleasure (Maital, 1986; Maital & Maital, 1994; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).  A common
precommitment constraint is payroll deduction.  When pension plan contributions, for example,
are deducted from an individual’s paycheck, temptations to spend that money are eliminated, and
the participant no longer has to make, on a monthly or biweekly basis, a conscious decision to
postpone consumption.  Her “willingness” to save is, in effect, guaranteed.5 Other
precommitment constraints include Christmas and vacation accounts, over-withholding of
income tax, and even mortgage-financed home purchases (Maital & Maital, 1994).6
Saving in Low-Income Households
In their current stages of development, none of the existing theories provides a suitable
explanation for saving and asset accumulation in low-income households.  The mainstream
economic theories described above are inadequate for many reasons.  Although the PIH and the
LCH have been very influential in the field of economics, the simplest versions of the theories do
not reflect detailed reality.  As explanations of saving in the general population, these theories
have been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds.  Additional weaknesses are
apparent when these theories are applied to low-income households.
Most fundamentally, both the LCH and the PIH assume that individuals have (or act as if they
have) almost-perfect vision regarding future income flows, prices, household consumption, and
                                                
5 It is interesting to note that, in a recent study of community development credit union members, 48% of survey
respondents said that direct payroll deposit (into savings) would make it easier for them to save (Silverman, 1997).
6 Mortgage-financed home purchases facilitate saving because mortgage payments are a contractual obligation and
because the part of each payment that goes toward principal increases the buyer’s home equity.  In fact, Maital and
Maital (1994) suggest that the desire for this precommitment mechanism is as strong a motivation for mortgage-
financed home purchases as the incentive created by the tax-deductibility of interest payments.
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life span and that they manifest rationality and self-control as they prepare for retirement.
However, as Bernheim and Scholz (1993) suggest,
...the life cycle decision is extraordinarily complex, in that it requires an
individual to contemplate labor earnings, investment strategies, macroeconomic
trends, and a vast assortment of risks, all over a very long time frame.  It would be
surprising if the average individual, in isolation, with no practice and little or no
training, would act as a perfectly rational, farsighted utility maximizer. (p. 87)
In fact, empirical studies suggest that the majority of Americans lack the financial sophistication
and information to make even basic economic calculations (Bernheim, 1994).  Since low-income
individuals are likely to have limited financial sophistication, they are particularly unlikely to
make optimal long-term decisions regarding saving and consumption.
There are other reasons that individuals may not adhere to their optimal lifetime consumption
profiles.  In the United States, the ability to smooth lifetime consumption typically requires
households to have incomes during their later working years that exceed their consumption needs
(enabling them to pay off debts and save for retirement) and to have savings which can act as a
cushion—or access to credit—when current income is low.  In reality, imperfect credit markets
and uncertainties regarding future income may prevent households from borrowing against
future income, so that they are unable to finance optimal consumption (Modigliani, 1986; Smyth,
1993).  Individuals with irregular earnings or with low lifetime earnings are particularly likely to
face binding liquidity constraints.  Moreover, many low-income individuals may never have
earnings that substantially exceed their consumption needs.
In addition to these theoretical weaknesses, empirical evidence regarding the LCH and the PIH is
ambiguous, at best.  The fact that many cross-sectional studies of saving reveal an inverted U-
shaped saving pattern across age categories is often cited as evidence for the LCH.  The results
of several time-series tests are also consistent with the LCH and the PIH.  In these instances,
however, there may be more accurate alternative explanations.  As Smyth (1993) and Green
(1984) point out, observed patterns of “hump-saving” are not necessarily consistent with the
precise pattern predicted by the LCH and do not rule out competing hypotheses.  In other words,
the failure of empirical tests to refute the LCH or the PIH does not prove that these models offer
the best explanation of saving.
There are other, more specific, challenges to the LCH and PIH.  Empirical studies suggest that
household consumption may be more sensitive to changes in transitory or current income than
either of these models predict.  Not only are yearly consumption patterns too highly correlated
with income, but over the life-cycle, young and old individuals appear to consume less than these
models predict while the middle-aged consume more (Thaler, 1990).  Furthermore, contrary to
LCH and PIH predictions, it appears that predictable changes in income result in both
consumption and saving changes rather than changes in saving alone (Wilcox, 1991).7
                                                
7 Recall that the LCH and PIH imply that predicted changes in income will result in changes in saving rather than
consumption, because individuals will have already adjusted their consumption to these anticipated changes.
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Empirical evidence also challenges the fungibility assumption, the belief that various forms of
wealth (both present and future) are very easily substitutable for one another.  This assumption
implies that changes in one form of saving will be offset by changes in other forms and that the
marginal propensity to consume out of all types of wealth should be equal.  In a review of
several related studies, however, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) note that no researcher has found a
complete (or even nearly complete) offset in other savings when pension contributions increased,
and some have found positive effects of pension saving on other saving.  The existence and
magnitude of offsetting effects from public policies designed to increase private saving is also
the subject of much debate.8  And, contrary to the fungibility assumption, it appears that the
marginal propensities to consume out of pension wealth and home equity are quite low (Thaler,
1990).
Finally, the empirical evidence cited above indicates that most low-income households have very
low saving rates and very limited asset accumulation.  The fact that these patterns are observed
even among households nearing the age of retirement challenges conventional life cycle models
and the more recent buffer-stock models of asset accumulation.9  However, there is some
evidence that empirical patterns are more consistent with the “augmented” life cycle models
proposed by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994a, 1994b, 1995).  These models incorporate
uncertainty regarding earnings, out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and length of life.  They also
model means-tested public welfare programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
and Medicaid.
Psychological and sociological propositions complement economic theories of saving by
attempting to explain saving-related motives, aspirations, and expectations.  Again, however, few
of these propositions explicitly attempt to explain the saving or asset accumulation of low-
income households.  Even more importantly, empirical support for these propositions is fairly
limited.  Many propositions have not been tested, and studies that do examine psychological and
sociological variables often suggest that they play a minor role in saving decisions, relative to
economic variables (e.g., Furnham, 1985; Lunt & Livingstone, 1991; Pritchard, Myers, &
Cassidy, 1989; Van Raaij & Gianotten, 1990).  Behavioral theories of saving have also devoted
little attention to low-income saving, and there have been few direct tests of behavioral
propositions.10
                                                
8 See, e.g., Bernheim (1999), Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994), Gravelle (1991), Hubbard & Skinner (1996), and
Poterba, Venti & Wise (1996a, 1996b).
9 Buffer-stock models assume that older households will save for retirement.  These models also imply that low-
income households should be more motivated to accumulate buffer stocks than middle- and upper-income
households, because their future consumption is more uncertain (Deaton, 1992, p. 194).
10 See Shefrin and Thaler (1988) for indirect evidence in support of behavioral propositions.
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Table 1.1  Summary of Neoclassical Economic Saving Theory
Key Assumptions Key Variables Expected Effects of IDAs
• Saving is largely a residual—what’s left
over after consumption decisions have
been made
• Individuals consider lifetime (not only
current) economic resources when
making consumption decisions, and
expectations regarding lifetime
resources are rational
• Individuals want to avoid large
fluctuations in consumption; saving,
dissaving, and borrowing allow
individuals to “smooth” consumption
• Individuals have access to perfect credit,
saving, and insurance markets
• Individuals have perfect knowledge
about how to save and about the costs
and benefits of saving
• Individual preferences are relatively
stable
• Income and assets






• IDAs increase the rate of return on saving
but may not result in net saving for two
reasons:
1. Individuals may finance deposits by
withdrawing money from existing
assets; and
2. Increases in the rate of return on assets
decrease the amount of saving needed
to finance a given level of future
consumption
• IDAs may increase saving and asset
accumulation because (in some cases)
deposits are not counted toward asset
limits of means-tested transfer programs
• IDAs may increase asset accumulation
because restrictions on withdrawals
increase the cost of spending IDA savings
• IDAs are not likely to change preferences
Table 1.2  Summary of Psychological and Sociological Saving Theory
Key Assumptions Key Variables Expected Effects of IDAs
• The effects of external stimuli on
economic behavior are conditioned by
intervening variables such as motives,
aspirations, and expectations
• Explicitly seeks to explain saving-
related motives, aspirations, and
expectations
• Individual preferences and aspirations
are shaped by economic and social
stimuli
• Consumer sentiment
• Social and cultural
norms
• Personal norms




• IDAs may increase saving because their
very existence sends the message that
saving is “good” and that low-income
households can save and accumulate
assets
• IDAs may increase saving because the act
of choosing an intended IDA use
encourages individuals to consider the
benefits of saving and asset accumulation
• IDAs may increase saving because
economic education classes teach
participants about the benefits of saving
and asset accumulation
• IDAs may increase saving because
individuals receive positive reinforcement
(both formal and informal) for saving
• IDAs may increase saving because
participants receive monthly statements
reminding them of their savings goals and
showing progress toward these goals
• There may be positive feedback effects: If
IDAs facilitate saving, then experiences of
successful saving may increase
participants’ motivation to save
• IDAs may change preferences because
economic education classes and match
deposits send the message that saving is
“good”
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Table 1.3  Summary of Behavioral Saving Theory
Key Assumptions Key Variables Expected Effects of IDAs
• Individuals have imperfect knowledge
about how to save
• Even when they understand the value of
saving and want to save, individuals
have trouble resisting temptations to
spend.  Therefore, individuals may
create their own behavioral incentives
and constraints
• Emphasis on financial management
strategies






• IDAs may increase saving because
economic education classes teach
financial management and saving
strategies
• IDAs may increase saving because
monthly saving goals encourage
participants to develop the habit of saving
regularly
• IDAs may increase saving because
automatic deposits help individuals resist
temptations to spend
• IDAs may increase asset accumulation
because restrictions on withdrawals help
individuals resist temptations to spend
• IDAs may increase saving by giving
participants a socially acceptable reason
not to share surplus resources
Expected Effects of IDAs
An IDA is a formal institution specifically designed to promote and facilitate saving and asset
accumulation in low-income households.  In this section, we describe the expected effects of
IDAs from each of the three theoretical perspectives.  This information is summarized in Tables
1.1-1.3
Neoclassical Economic Theories
As noted above, neoclassical economic models emphasize the effects of incentives on behavior.
Most relevant to saving is the rate of return.  However, neoclassical economic theory does not
predict that an increase in the rate of return will necessarily increase saving.  There are two key
issues.  First, changes in the rate of return on assets may simply result in the “reshuffling” of
assets, with no new saving.  Second, for net savers, an increase in the after-tax rate of return has
two contradictory effects.  Individuals may choose to save more because the price of current
consumption increases relative to the price of future consumption (the substitution effect).  On
the other hand, with higher rates of return, individuals can save less and still enjoy the same
amount of future consumption (the income effect).  Therefore, neoclassical economic theory
does not predict that IDAs will necessarily increase saving.
Other incentives and disincentives that are relevant to IDAs include asset restrictions associated
with means-tested transfer programs and the cost of spending IDA savings.  When IDA deposits
are not counted toward the asset limits associated with transfer programs, as in the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, IDAs may increase saving and asset
accumulation.  In addition, IDAs may be expected to increase asset accumulation because
restrictions on IDA withdrawals increase the cost of spending IDA savings.
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Finally, in addition to incentive structures, recall that neoclassical economic models often
attribute unexplained differences in behavior to differences in individual preferences.  These
preferences are assumed to be autonomous and stable.  Neoclassical models do not predict that
IDAs will change preferences.
Psychological and Sociological Theories
From a psychological and sociological perspective, IDAs may increase saving and asset
accumulation for several reasons.  First, the very existence of IDAs sends the message that
saving is “good” and that low-income households can save and accumulate assets.11  Second,
economic education classes teach participants about the benefits of saving and asset
accumulation.  Third, the act of choosing an intended IDA goal encourages participants to think
about the benefits of saving and asset accumulation.  Fourth, IDA participants receive positive
reinforcement for saving.  This positive reinforcement is both formal, through match deposits,
and informal, through staff and peer encouragement.  Fifth, IDA participants receive monthly
statements reminding them of their saving goals and showing progress toward these goals.
Finally, there may be positive feedback effects: If IDAs facilitate saving (for any number of
reasons), then experiences of successful saving may increase participants’ motivation to save.12
Behavioral Theories
Behavioral theories also imply that IDAs are likely to increase saving and asset accumulation.
First, economic education classes teach financial management and saving strategies.  Second,
having monthly saving goals may encourage participants to develop the habit of saving regularly.
Third, when available, automatic deposits into IDAs help individuals resist temptations to spend
money before depositing it into their accounts.  Fourth, restrictions on withdrawals help
individuals resist temptations to spend their savings.  Finally, IDAs give participants a socially
acceptable reason for not sharing surplus resources.
Institutional Determinants of Saving
Sherraden (1990, 1991) has proposed a theory of welfare based on assets which emphasizes the
role of institutions (i.e., formal and informal socioeconomic relationships, rules, and incentives)
in asset accumulation.  This perspective is part of a larger body of institutional theory
emphasizing that societal institutions shape, and give meaning to, individual behavior (see, e.g.,
Gordon, 1980; Neale, 1987).  According to Sherraden (1991), “asset accumulations are primarily
the result of institutionalized mechanisms involving explicit connections, rules, incentives, and
subsidies” (p. 116).  He emphasizes the subsidies provided through housing- and retirement-
related tax benefits, including deductions for home mortgage interest and property taxes,
deferment and exclusion of capital gains on sales of principal residences, exclusions for
employment-sponsored pension contributions and earnings, deferments for Individual
                                                
11 For more on the role of “messages” conveyed by saving incentives, and even the simple existence of saving
institutions, see Bernheim (1996), Carroll and Summers (1987), and Cagan (1965).
12 For more on the role of aspirations and expectations of success, see Furnham (1985), Katona (1975), and Lewin,
Dembo, Festinger, and Sears (1944).
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Retirement Accounts and Keogh Plans, and employer contributions to employee pension plans.
Because these mechanisms for asset accumulation are subsidized or receive preferential tax
treatment, Sherraden claims that it is easier for individuals who have access to these institutions
to accumulate assets.  But for the most part the poor are excluded from these opportunities.
It is important to note that each of the theories described above calls attention to institutions that
are expected to affect saving and asset accumulation.  Neoclassical economic theories emphasize
the role of institutions that affect the economic costs and benefits of saving (e.g., markets and
public policies).  Psychological and sociological theories consider institutions that affect an
individual’s understanding or perceptions of economic costs and benefits, that change non-
economic costs and benefits, and/or that shape preferences (e.g., peers and family members).
Behavioral theories highlight the role of institutions that allow individuals to modify the costs
and benefits of saving by creating their own incentives and constraints (e.g., payroll deduction,
saving clubs, and the option to over-withhold income taxes).  By integrating these theoretical
perspectives—while emphasizing the role of institutions—it may be possible to develop a theory
that more accurately explains saving and asset accumulation in the general population and in the
low-income population.
Beverly and Sherraden (1999) have identified four major categories of institutional variables that
are expected to shape saving and asset accumulation: (1) incentives, (2) information, (3) access,
and (4) facilitation.  These authors have also documented differences in access to these
institutions13 and have argued that limited access to these institutions may help explain the low
saving rates and limited asset accumulation of low-income households.  If empirical research
confirms that these four categories of institutions (and perhaps others) do indeed predict saving
and asset accumulation, then these constructs may provide a framework for integrating existing
theories of saving and asset accumulation and may provide guidance to those seeking to develop
programs and policies that promote asset accumulation.
Summary
With few exceptions, existing studies on saving and asset accumulation fails to explain the low
rates of saving and asset accumulation observed in low-income households.  Sherraden has
argued that institutions have a substantial influence on saving-related behaviors and outcomes.
Although economic, psychological, sociological, and behavioral theories all imply that particular
institutions affect saving and asset accumulation, proponents of these theories have rarely used
institutional variables to explain patterns of low-income saving and asset accumulation.  We
argue here that, by emphasizing the role of institutions and by integrating existing theoretical
perspectives, it may be possible to develop a theory that more accurately explains saving and
asset accumulation, particularly in low-income households.  In this context, it is important to
identify specific institutional characteristics that predict saving and asset accumulation and that
offer guidance for programs and policies designed promote these behaviors and outcomes.
                                                
13 For example, low-income individuals have less access to attractive tax benefits for asset accumulation, and those
receiving means-tested welfare benefits often face saving disincentives in the form of asset restrictions.  Members of
low-income households are less likely to have access to financial education (see, e.g., Bernheim & Garrett, 1996)
and to mechanisms that facilitate saving, such as payroll deduction and mortgage-financed home purchases.
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In this chapter, we have also outlined the expected effects of IDAs from each of the three
theoretical perspectives.  Although the MIS IDA data do not allow us to evaluate the effects of
IDAs in detail, we draw broad conclusions regarding theories of saving and asset accumulation
in the final chapter of this report.
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2.  Asset Building and
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs)
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are special savings accounts that are designed to help
people build assets for increased self-sufficiency and long-term economic security.  Account
holders receive matching funds as they save for purposes such as buying a first home, job
training, going to a college, or starting or expanding a small business.  IDAs can begin as early
as birth and they are progressive (that is, low-wealth individuals and families receive greater
matching funds).  Funding for IDAs can come from public, non-profit, and/or private sources
(funding partnerships are common).
IDAs were introduced by Sherraden (1988, 1991), who suggested that (1) saving and asset
accumulation is largely a matter of structures and incentives (not merely personal preferences),
and (2) assets may have a wide range of positive psychological, social, and economic impacts (in
addition to deferred consumption).  IDAs are a conceptually simple community development and
public policy tool, adaptable to a wide range of applications and circumstances.
A brief history of asset building proposals and IDA policy development is summarized below:
• Asset building as an anti-poverty policy emerged with key publications in the 1980s and
1990s: The Safety Net As Ladder (Friedman, 1988), Assets and the Poor (Sherraden, 1991),
and Black Wealth/White Wealth (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995).
• The first policy reports on IDAs were published in Washington, DC, by the Corporation for
Enterprise Development (CFED) and the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) in 1989 and 1990,
creating a policy discussion that has built over the past decade.  IDA proposals do not fit into
a stereotypical “liberal” or “conservative” mold, and they typically have bipartisan support.
• An important impact of this discussion is that restrictions on asset holding for those who
receive means-tested benefits have changed.  Almost all states relaxed these restrictions
during the 1990s.
• The first IDAs were initiated by community-based organizations in the early 1990s.
• Today, more than 200 community IDA programs are operating or ready to begin, and many
more are in planning stages.
• United Way programs have started multi-site IDA programs in Atlanta, St. Louis, and
Denver.
• The Eagle Staff Fund of First Nations Development Institute has launched IDA projects
designed to serve American Indian populations.
• IDAs were included as a state option in the 1996 federal “welfare reform” law.  Two
provisions of the law are noteworthy:  states can use Temporary Assistance to Needy
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Families (TANF) resources to fund IDAs; any money in an IDA is exempt from asset limits
in all federal means-tested programs.  The latter is an important policy precedent.  In 1999,
the federal government ruled that IDAs would not count against a participant's “clock” for
TANF eligibility.
• IDAs have been included in the welfare reform (TANF) plans of at least 25 states.  To date, 9
states are using or plan to use TANF funds for IDAs.
• Several states have allocated state funds for IDAs, including Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
• Federal legislation for IDAs, The Assets for Independence Act (AFIA), with $125 million in
funding over 5 years, was signed into law in October 1998.
• Building on the principles and early successes of IDA programs, President Clinton proposed
Universal Savings Accounts (USAs) in his 1999 State of the Union address.  USAs would be
matched savings accounts for low-income workers, to be funded with 11% of the budget
surplus (estimated at $38 billion per year) over the next 15 years.  Data on IDAs from ADD
influenced the development and design of the USA proposal.
Other asset building developments in home ownership programs, individual training accounts,
and other asset-based initiatives have grown over the past decade as well.  There are also an
increasing number of proposals in the federal government for Children’s Savings Accounts,
expanded and progressive IRAs, and similar asset building measures.  At the moment, this
overall policy direction is in a period of rapid innovation.
At the same time, key questions for research in asset-based policy are being identified.  The first
question, which is related to the “policy impact,” is:  Do IDAs enable the poor to accumulate
assets and use them to meet life goals?  Two additional questions related to IDAs may in fact be
more fundamental, connecting to existing bodies of social science knowledge.  These questions
have been identified and later specified as working propositions (Sherraden, 1999).  The second
question is:  How can the poor save?  In brief, there is reason to believe that the poor save not
only because of personal preferences, but also because of institutional factors -- information,
incentives, access, facilitation (discussed in Chapter 1).  The third question is:  What are the
effects of asset holding?  In brief, asset holding appears to have multiple and generally positive
effects on individuals, families, and communities, in addition to deferred consumption
(Sherraden, 1991; Page-Adams and Sherraden, 1997; Boshara, Scanlon, and Page-Adams, 1998).
These last two questions have the potential to alter the way saving and asset holding are
understood, and they provide an intellectual foundation for asset-based policy.  However, a great
deal more empirical and theoretical work will be necessary.
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3.  The American Dream Demonstration (ADD)
The first large-scale test of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) as a social and economic
development tool for low-wealth households and communities was initiated by the Corporation
for Enterprise Development (CFED) in September 1997 in the form of a national policy
demonstration.  The Downpayments on the American Dream Policy Demonstration, or the
“American Dream Demonstration” (ADD), involves 13 sponsoring organizations1 selected
through a competitive process to design, implement, and administer IDA initiatives in their local
communities.  Fourteen IDA programs in ADD are establishing about 2,000 IDAs in low-income
communities across the country, with 13 programs each having 50 to 150 accounts and one
program (experimental design) establishing 500 accounts.  The demonstration will operate from
1997 through 2001, with an additional two years of post-program evaluation to 2003.
In addition to offering matched savings accounts, each IDA program offers an economic
education curriculum.  Each program determines the amount of class participation required.
The Sponsoring Organizations
Thirteen sponsoring organizations are participating in the American Dream Demonstration.
Here, we briefly describe these organizations and the populations served by their IDA programs.
This information is summarized in Table 3.1
ADVOCAP, Inc., Fond Du Lac, Wisconsin.  ADVOCAP is a community action agency whose
mission is to create opportunities for people and communities to reduce poverty. Operating
revenues of $7.4 million support 180 staff positions and the operation of agency services across
12 different departments, serving three counties.  ADVOCAP provides emergency services as
well as permanent solutions based on asset development approaches. Asset development models
include a business development program, established in 1985, a first-time home ownership
program, established in 1990, and one of the first IDA programs, established in 1995.  The IDA
program serves a target population at or below 150% of the federal poverty line.  Participants are
primarily referrals from other ADVOCAP programs.
Alternatives Federal Credit Union (AFCU), Ithaca, New York.  AFCU is a community
development credit union whose mission is to provide a full range of banking services and
financial resources for small businesses, non-profit organizations, and under-served segments of
the community.  AFCU stresses customer service and provides alternative financial options
including flexible mortgages, community lending partnerships, and a youth credit union.  AFCU
partnered with Ithaca Housing Authority's Family Self-Sufficiency Program to develop and
implement its IDA program.  The IDA program serves a target population of single parents and
youth.
Bay Area IDA Collaborative, Oakland, California.  The Bay Area IDA Collaborative is
comprised of 13 community-based organizations in the San Francisco Bay area which
                                                          
1 One sponsoring organization, the Community Action Project of Tulsa County, has two IDA programs.  Therefore,
in future chapters of this report, we describe and refer to 14 “IDA programs” but 13 “sponsoring organizations.”
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collectively serve a significant portion of the low-income population in the area.  The East Bay
Asian Local Development Corporation (EBALDC) is a Community Development Corporation
and is the lead organization for the Collaborative.  EBALDC has expanded its mission from
serving the Asian/Pacific Islander community to building strong communities among diverse
low-income populations.  Services include affordable housing, community organizing and
planning, and economic development.  The IDA program serves low-income minority residents
of the communities served by member organizations.
Capital Area Asset Building Corporation (CAAB), Washington, DC.  CAAB is a non-profit
corporation comprised of eight community-based organizations whose goal is to bring an asset-
based economic development system to scale in the disadvantaged neighborhoods of the District
of Columbia.  The collaborative was created to: build capacity by devising a centralized,
systemic approach to implementing IDAs in the District; craft a collaborative fundraising
strategy to minimize competition among community-based organizations; and join forces in
advocacy activities to help pass asset accumulation legislation for low-income residents.  The
IDA program serves clients of the collaborative member organizations.
Central Texas Mutual Housing Association (CTMHA), Austin, TX.  CTMHA is a
community-based non-profit organization whose mission is to help families improve their lives
and pursue their dreams by providing affordable housing.  Since 1986, CTMHA has developed
1,655 units of affordable housing in ten Central and North Texas rental communities.  With a
staff of 27, CTMHA has created several resident service programs for low-income tenants,
including after-school and summer youth programs, computer and English-as-a-Second-
Language classes, and the IDA program.  The IDA program serves community residents.
Counseling and training is offered in both English and Spanish.
Central Vermont Community Action Council, Inc. (CVCAC), Barre, Vermont.  CVCAC is
a community action agency whose focus is on community economic development and
developmental family services.  CVCAC provides advocacy and programmatic services for
economically disadvantaged families and individuals in 56 towns in rural north-central Vermont.
The 111-member professional staff provides services to about 6,000 persons annually. CVCAC
has partnered with several community agencies in implementing its IDA program.  The IDA
program serves clients of CVCAC, clients of the Department of Social Welfare (TANF
recipients), and young adults (ages 16-24).
Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC), Tulsa, Oklahoma.  CAPTC is a
community-based, comprehensive anti-poverty agency whose mission is to help individuals and
families in economic need achieve self-sufficiency through emergency aid, medical care,
housing, community development, education, and advocacy in an atmosphere of respect.  Recent
examples of new programs that have grown significantly in response to client demand include
CAPTC's affordable housing and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programs.  CAPTC's IDA
program focuses on those who are making the effort toward achieving self-sufficiency but who
are not yet able to escape poverty.  The IDA program targets working poor households with
children who qualify for the maximum EITC refund.  Many of the IDA participants are clients of
other CAPTC services.
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CAPTC started a second IDA program as an experimental design.  The second program has a
lower family income threshold, 150% of poverty rather than 200% of the poverty threshold.
Heart of America Family Services (HAFS), Family Focus Center, Kansas City, Missouri.
HAFS is a 120-year-old non-profit organization dedicated to supporting and strengthening
families in need through information, education, and intervention.  Its programs serve 60,000
people annually at more than 14 locations.  The Family Focus Center is one of HAFS’
community-based programs that provides neighborhood-based family support, including an IDA
program, to a primarily Latino population in Kansas City’s Westside.  The Family Focus Center
has partnered with other neighborhood organizations and with the University of Kansas School
of Social Welfare to implement the program.  Counseling and training are offered in both
English and Spanish.  The IDA program serves the neighborhood area and clients at the Family
Focus Center.
Human Solutions, Inc., Portland, Oregon.  Human Solutions is a non-profit community
housing organization whose focus is to provide housing and related services to homeless and
low-income families in East Portland and East Multnomah County.  Since 1992, the organization
has also purchased and developed over 150 units of low-income housing, and it manages market
rate housing owned by others for homeless families.  The IDA program serves residents of
Human Solutions' rental properties.
Mountain Association for Community Economic Development (MACED), Berea,
Kentucky.  In 1976, MACED was created by ten community development organizations in
Central Appalachia to provide technical assistance to community-based groups in the region.
MACED’s core programs are business development, sustainable communities, and land and
resources.  The “Pathways to Prosperity” IDA program was developed for low-income residents
of Owsley County (Kentucky’s poorest county).  Several local community organizations
partnered with MACED in implementing the IDA program, including the Owsley County Action
Team, a citizen group that participates in MACED’s Sustainable Communities Initiative, and the
Central Appalachian Peoples Federal Credit Union.
Near Eastside IDA Program, Indianapolis, Indiana.  The Near Eastside Community Federal
Credit Union (NECFCU) and the John H. Boner Community Center partnered to create the Near
Eastside IDA Program.  The NECFCU, founded in 1981, is the only community development
credit union in Indiana, and houses the accounts for IDA participants.  The Boner Center is a
neighborhood community center that has provided a broad spectrum of social services since
1972.  The Near Eastside IDA Program serves youth and adults living on the Near Eastside of
Indianapolis, and/or participating in Boner Center or Credit Union programs.
Shorebank, Chicago, Illinois.  Shorebank is a community development financial institution
whose mission is to increase opportunities in underserved communities by identifying and
supporting investment in local assets.  The IDA program is a joint effort between South Shore
Bank and Shorebank Neighborhood Institute (SNI), Shorebank’s non-profit affiliate.  SNI’s
primary focus is on human and social capital development, as well as targeted enterprise
development.  The program targets African-Americans living in Chicago’s South and West sides,
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including families living in subsidized rental properties owned by Shorebank.  Most participants
are referred by other partner organizations.
Women's Self-Employment Project (WSEP), Chicago, Illinois.  WSEP is a microenterprise
development organization that provides entrepreneurial training, business development, and
financial services to low- and moderate-income women.  WSEP’s mission is to raise the income
and degree of economic self-sufficiency of women through a strategy of self-employment, and to
serve as a catalyst for developing viable options for alleviating poverty.  In 1995, WSEP initiated
an IDA demonstration with welfare recipients; it was one of the first IDA programs in the
country.  Expansion of the program now includes a partnership with the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) and includes residents within the targeted CHA programs.  The IDA program
serves residents of CHA HOPE 6 developments, graduates of WSEP programs, and employees
of WSEP participant businesses.
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4.  Monitoring/Management Information
System (MIS IDA)
The data in this report come from MIS IDA, a software package created and supported by CSD.
MIS IDA is innovative, commercial-quality, adaptable software.  It encourages IDA programs to
adopt best practices; provides management tools such as account statements, mailings, and more
than 30 reports; and generates a comprehensive database on program characteristics, participant
characteristics, and aggregate enrollment, saving, and withdrawal patterns.
CSD has been proactive in planning and developing MIS IDA.  We identified the need for a
management information system in 1995 and in 1996 put together a national team to identify
data that should be included in such a system.  Soon thereafter, we began programming, and by
mid-1997 we released Version 1.0 of MIS IDA.  Almost immediately, we began to develop
Version 2.0, which was released in 1998.  As of January 2000, Version 3.0 is the current version.
MIS IDA is currently used in over 30 states and the District of Columbia.
Version 2.02 was used to collect the monitoring data in this report.  Sponsoring organizations
sent MIS IDA data to CSD via E-mail.  The data collected in this manner are timely and fully
comparable across programs.  To our knowledge, this is the first time that a policy
demonstration, at the outset, has created its own monitoring software to track and report on
progress across multiple sites.
Table 4.1 summarizes the types of data collected in the current version of MIS IDA.
MIS IDA has also proven to be a very effective mechanism for technical assistance and for
evaluation.  Through training and support for users of MIS IDA, CSD provides extensive
technical assistance to IDA programs.  Many program-design and management problems are
avoided or resolved in this process.  Moreover, with MIS IDA in place, an IDA program is in a
position to track its own performance, and the database created by MIS IDA greatly facilitates
external evaluation.  The information collected by MIS IDA may also be sent to a central
location and merged with data from other IDA programs for analysis.
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Table 4.1  Selected Data Collected by MIS IDA
I.  Program Information
Program Design Criteria
• Age of organization
• Type of financial institution
• Requirements for written saving
plan
• Period of account statements
• Number of signatures for withdrawal
• Penalties for unapproved
withdrawals
• Permissible uses for asset purchase
• Annual/lifetime limits on IDA
balance
• Match rate(s)
• Length of waiting period before
withdrawal
• Planned amount of match funds
(yearly)
• Amount of match funds by source
Economic Education
• Hours of general economic
education curriculum











• Staff time for IDA program
• Unsalaried staff time for IDA
program
• Time spent by partner organizations
on IDA program
• Accounts planned for next period
Funding Partners
• Type of organization
• Permissible uses for asset purchase
• Partnership begin/end dates
• Amount of contribution
• Type of contribution
II.  Participant Information
Demographics
• Social security number
• Enrollment date
• Gender






• Number of adults in household
• Number of children in household
• Level of education
• Employment status
• Monthly gross income
• Previous TANF or AFDC status
• Current TANF status
• Program exit date
• Reason for exit
• Affiliation with sponsoring
organization
Assets/Liabilities
• Vehicle value/loan amount
• Home value/mortgage amount
• Business value/loan amount
• Rental property and land
value/loan amount
• Investment value
• Checking account value
• Savings account value
• Debt to friends/family
• Liability for past due household
bills
• Liability for credit card bills
• Liability for student loans
• Liability for medical bills
Economic Education/Case
Management
• Type of economic education
received
• Number of hours of education
received
• Case Notes
II.  Participant Information cont.
Account Information
• Bank account number
• Financial institution name
• Date account opened
• Maximum savings goal
• Target monthly savings goal
• Account closed date
• Match rate
• Funding partner(s) of this account
• Permissible uses for asset
purchase
Participant Savings Information
• Beginning balance for period
• Number of deposits for period
• Amount of deposits for period
• Number of withdrawals for period
• Amount of withdrawals for period
• Amount of service fees for period
• Amount of interest for period
• End balance for period
• Match funds for period
• Total IDA savings for period
Matched Withdrawals
• Use of withdrawal
• Vendor name and address
• Withdrawal date
• Participant withdrawal amount
• Funding partner(s) match amount
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5.  Data Preparation and Analysis
MIS IDA software has been used by all of the sponsoring organizations from the outset,
upgraded over time.  CSD trained IDA program staff in the use of MIS IDA.  In addition, CSD
met with IDA program staff twice a year in meetings convened by CFED to respond to MIS IDA
questions and concerns.  CSD also provides a telephone support line and pays particular attention
to support for ADD organizations.  Lissa Johnson has traveled to 10 of the 13 sponsoring
organizations to assist with software use and data management.  In short, CSD has been very
“hands on” in the use of MIS IDA to help ensure quality data in ADD.
MIS IDA is by design a program-administered data-collection instrument, and despite the
training and support efforts described above, variations in data completeness and accuracy
inevitably occur.  CSD has worked to ensure that MIS IDA data are as complete and accurate as
possible.  Staff members have developed a computer program that identifies missing data and
values that are outside of an expected range.  When identified, each of the missing and
questionable values is sent back to the appropriate IDA program for confirmation or correction.
This process substantially improves the quality of the data.
The analyses described in this report are straightforward.  First, we calculate descriptive statistics
for programs and participants.  Second, we document aggregate enrollment, saving, and
withdrawal patterns for the entire demonstration, i.e., across all IDA programs.  Third, we
estimate bivariate relationships between program characteristics and saving outcomes, and
between participant characteristics and saving outcomes.  Bivariate tests include Pearson r
correlations, t tests, Chi-square tests, and analyses of variance.  Fourth, we use multiple-
regression analyses to examine relationships between individual saving outcomes, participant
characteristics, and program characteristics.  This regression tells us which participant and
program variables are significantly related to saving outcomes, controlling for all other variables
in the analysis.
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6.  Program Characteristics
In this chapter, we first define various types of IDA program characteristics.  These variables are
measured for the period July 1, 1998 through June 30, 1999.
Age of organization: In years.  The sponsoring organization is the entity that houses an IDA
program.  All organizations in ADD existed before ADD, and they all run programs in addition
to the IDA programs.
Age of program: The number of months between the opening of the first ADD program IDA
account and June 1999.
Economic education hours: Hours of economic-education coursework offered.
Average match rate: For a given IDA program, the sum of the match rates across participants,
divided by the number of participants.  This variable is an average because some programs have
variable match rates.
Wait period: Weeks after enrollment that a participant must wait before making an approved
withdrawal
Average monthly deposit goal: Annual maximum match potential averaged across participants
and divided by 12.
Number of participants: The sum of the number of participants at the end of each month of
operation, divided by the number of months of operation.
Average income poverty level: The sum of income poverty levels of all participants in a
program, divided by the number of participants.  The income poverty level is defined as monthly
household income multiplied by 12 and then divided by the official family-size-adjusted poverty
guideline.
Participants’ affiliation with organization: The percentage of IDA participants with some
affiliation with the sponsoring organization before enrollment in the IDA program.  This variable
was estimated by the sponsoring organizations, not computed from MIS IDA data.
Organizational Size: The number of full-time-equivalent worker-months by paid workers at the
organizational level, divided by the number of months.
IDA FTEs:  The number of full-time-equivalent worker-months, whether paid or volunteer, in
the IDA program, divided by the number of months.
Average IDA FTEs: The number of full-time-equivalent worker-months, whether paid or
volunteer, in the IDA program, divided by the number of participant-months.
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IDA Expenses:  The sum of monthly expenditures of the IDA program, except funds for
matches, divided by the number of months.
Average IDA expenses:  The sum of monthly expenditures of the IDA program, except funds
for matches, divided by the number of participant-months.
Marketing activity:  The sum of different types of marketing activity for each month divided by
the number of months.
These variables are summarized in Table 6.1 below and later used for analysis.
Table 6.1  Program Characteristics
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
Age of Organization 20.71 22.50 2.00 36.00 10.12
Age of Program 13.93 15.00 6.00 23.00 4.70
Economic Education Hours 15.07 11.00 6.00 50.00 11.23
Average Match Rate 2.18 1.98 1.00 5.33 1.07
Wait Period 9.50 0.00 0.00 52.00 16.02
Average Monthly Deposit Goal 49.69 41.67 15.00 83.33 20.66
Number of Participants 68.83 68.62 33.75 145.50 26.15
Average Income Poverty Level 1.16 1.18 0.85 1.43 0.19
Participants’ Affiliation with
Organization
0.61 0.68 0.12 1.00 0.34
Organizational Size 69.52 29.02 2.14 228.36 74.41
IDA FTEs 2.86 2.25 1.41 6.94 1.61
Average IDA FTEs .05 .03 .02 .11 .03
IDA Expenses 8,619.43 6,492.00 1,846.00 18,301.00 4,921.24
Average IDA Expenses 136.92 99.69 26.83 295.97 86.86
Marketing Activity 2.75 2.92 0.25 4.25 1.02
Administrative Characteristics
Tables 6.2 through 6.10 summarize the administrative characteristics of the 14 IDA programs in
ADD as of June 30, 1999.  Thirteen sponsoring organizations submit data to CSD.  However,
one organization sponsors two different IDA programs; thus, the overall number of IDA
programs reflected in the data is 14.
Table 6.2  Organizational Type
Organization Type Number of Programs
Community Development Organization 6
Social Service Agency 2
Bank or Credit Union 2
Housing Development Organization 2
Collaboration 2
All 14 IDA programs are run by private, not-for-profit organizations.  As indicated above, the
largest number of IDA programs are run by community development organizations.
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Table 6.3 shows permissible uses of the IDA.  These uses are not mutually exclusive; many
programs allow a variety of uses.  Home purchase, microenterprise development, and post-
secondary education are the most common permissible uses, followed by job training and home
repair.
Table 6.4  Location of Funds
Type of Institution Number of Programs
Bank or Savings and Loan Institution 9
Credit Union 5
The most common place for the deposit of funds is a bank or savings and loan institution (Table
6.4).  The remaining five IDA programs use a credit union for deposit of funds (two of these
programs are run by credit unions).
IDA accounts are usually held in the names of individual participants (in three cases accounts are
in the names of both the participant and organization), but matching funds are always kept in
separate accounts, i.e., not merged with participant savings until the funds are actually used
(Table 6.5).
All 14 financial institutions are providing account information to IDA programs.  This
information is entered or imported into MIS IDA on a monthly basis, which then generates
account statements for each IDA participant showing savings, match, and total IDA balance.
All 14 IDA programs have interest-bearing accounts, sometimes above the passbook rate.  This
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Table 6.3  Permissible Uses of IDAs
Number of Programs
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Table 6.5  IDA Account Information





Held in Separate Account 14










Penalties for Unapproved Use of IDAs
Yes 9
No 5
Table 6.6  IDA Match Rates






Low 1:1  High 2:1 4
Low 2:1  High 7:1 1
Nine programs offer a single match rate, ranging from 1:1 to 6:1 (Table 6.6).  The 6:1 match rate
is in an impoverished, rural county.  Five programs offer varied match rates depending on IDA
use and/or participant economic status.
Table 6.7  Overall Partner Funding





All 14 of the programs are funded through CFED, a not-for-profit organization.  Many programs
have also received funding from for-profit and/or public sources (Table 6.7).
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Face-to-face presentations are the most frequent type of marketing activity, and occur at all 14
programs (Table 6.8).  Print-based marketing (newsletter, newspaper, and brochure) are also
used by most programs.
General financial education and homeowership education are offered by all 14 IDA programs.
Microenterprise education occurs at 11 programs, but education for educational uses of IDAs
occurs at only 6 programs.































 General Financial Education
Number of Programs
Table 6.9  Financial Education Offered
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Dropped if no deposit in 3
consecutive months or if





$500/year 1:1 – 2:1 depending on
date joined and TANF
participation




Dropped after 2 missed






$750/year 2:1 for home IDAs; other
restrictions may apply;








Participants may be dropped
for missing more than 3
deposits per year, making
several unauthorized
withdrawals, or missing any
classes.
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for missing more than 3
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program at the discretion of
HAFS.”
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MACED $180/year 6:1 for existing
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meetings without valid cause
Near Eastside IDA
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year for 3 years;
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Ranges from 1:1 to 3:1 Privately funded IDAs
have ceilings of $2,000;
state funded IDAs could
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May be dropped if no
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$240/year in year 1;
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deposits made within 3
consecutive months or any
unauthorized withdrawals
made.
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7.  Participant Characteristics
In this chapter, we present measures of characteristics of 1,326 participants in ADD as of June
30, 1999.  A participant is defined as someone who is enrolled in an IDA program and who has
at least one account statement recorded in MIS IDA.  This definition excludes 54 people who
enrolled in an IDA program but never opened a bank account, and it also excludes 26 people
who enrolled and opened a bank account recently but who did not have an account statement
recorded in MIS IDA as of June 30, 1999.  This definition of participant includes all those who
had at least one account statement recorded in MIS IDA but later dropped out.
All variables were measured at the time of enrollment.  Furthermore, the program sponsors were
asked to update information that could change every six months.  As of June 30, 1999, about
18% of participants had had some element in their record updated.  It seems likely that some data
should have been updated but were not, although we cannot know to what extent.
Characteristics of participants are defined below.
Gender: Male or female.
Residence: Whether the area where a participant lives is urban (or suburban) vs. rural (or small
town).
Race/Ethnicity: Whether the participant identifies him or herself as African-American,
Caucasian, Latino or Hispanic, Native-American, Asian-American or Pacific-Islander, or
“other”.  For some analyses, Native Americans, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and “other” are
collapsed into one category.
Age: Age in years, computed as 1999 minus the year of birth as recorded in MIS IDA.
Marital status: Whether never-married, married, divorced, separated, or widowed.  For some
analyses, divorced, separated, and widowed are collapsed into one category.
Household type: Whether the household is composed of a single adult without children, a single
adult with children, two married adults without children, or two married adults with children.
Education: Whether the highest grade completed corresponds to less than a high-school
diploma, a high-school diploma, some college, or a college degree.
Employment status: Whether employed full-time, employed part-time, not employed
voluntarily, or unemployed involuntarily.  The category not employed voluntarily includes
homemakers, students, people in job-training programs, retired persons, and the disabled.  The
category unemployed involuntarily includes people who are laid-off or who are seeking
employment.
Children: Number of people 17 years of age or younger in the household.
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Adults: Number of people 18 years of age or older in the household.
Monthly household income: Income from all sources to the household.  The measure of income
includes inflows of cash from wage employment, public assistance, self-employment, child
support, family or friends, pensions, investments, and other cash sources (see Table 7.13).
Income poverty level: Monthly household income multiplied by 12 and then divided by the
official family-size-adjusted poverty guideline.
Source of household income: Whether the household had income from wage employment,
public assistance, self-employment, child support, family or friends, pensions or retirement,
investments, or “other.”
Welfare status: Whether the participant currently receives TANF, received TANF or AFDC
sometime in the past, or never received TANF or AFDC.
Bank use: Whether or not, in addition to an IDA account, the participant had a checking account
or a savings account at enrollment.
Dependency ratio: Number of children divided by number of adults.
Types of assets: Whether the participant had a checking account, a savings account, a vehicle, a
home, a business, rental property or land, or stocks, bonds, or other investments.  (Note that
income is measured for households but that assets and liabilities are measured for participants.)
Total assets: Sum of value of all assets.
Financial assets: Total assets minus home and vehicle.  This includes investments in business
and property, which only a small percentage of ADD participants have.
Types of liabilities: Whether the participant owed debts for home, vehicle, business, property or
land, student loans, past-due household bills, medical bills, credit-card debt, or debt with family
or friends.
Total liabilities: Sum of value of all liabilities.
Consumer debt/income ratio: The value of consumer liabilities divided by monthly income.
Consumer liabilities are defined as total liabilities minus debt owed on a home and vehicle.  This
includes business and property loans, which only a small percentage of ADD participants have.
Net worth: Total assets minus total liabilities.
Intended use of IDA: Includes home purchase, home repair, post-secondary education, job
training, microenterprise, and retirement.
Economic education: Hours received.
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On the pages that follow, we use bar charts to depict the distribution of the values of selected
participant characteristics.  After that, we discuss how the population of participants in ADD

















































Table 7.2  Residence
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Note:  Data are missing for six participants.
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Table 7.8  Employment Status
Note: “Unemployed Involuntarily” includes those who were laid off (waiting for call back) and those who were currently
seeking employment.  “Not Employed Voluntarily” includes those who were currently in school or job training programs
(not working), homemakers, disabled individuals, and retired individuals.
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Table 7.12  Income Poverty Level














Table 7.11  Total Monthly Household Income
Note:  Data are missing for 11 participants.
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Note:  Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.






















Table 7.14  Welfare Status














Note:  Banked is defined as having a checking or savings account.  This is in addition to the IDA account.
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Note:  Data are missing for 123 participants.
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Note: Data are missing for 120 participants.
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Table 7.18  Types of Liability
Percent
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Table 7.20  Value of Participant Assets in Dollars
Asset Type Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Standard
Deviation
Checking Account 219 35 0 7,000 481
Vehicle 2,920 1,000 0 27,000 4,336
Savings Account 265 2 0 9,000 810
Home 9,129 0 0 350,000 26,085
Business 435 0 0 75,000 3,409
Stocks, Bonds and Other
Investment
458 0 0 80,000 3,368
Rental Property or Land 431 0 0 180,000 5,759
Total Assets 13,775 2,235 0 398,500 30,527
Table 7.21  Value of Participant Liabilities in Dollars
Liability Type Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Standard
Deviation
Past Due Household Bills 201 0 0 16,000 906
Credit Card Bills 785 0 0 50,000 2,727
Vehicle Loan 1,592 0 0 24,000 3,682
Loan from Friends/Family 459 0 0 120,000 3,760
Home Mortgage 5,544 0 0 220,000 18,995
Medical Bills 219 0 0 42,000 1,849
Student Loan 651 0 0 50,000 3,361
Property or Land Loan 126 0 0 35,000 1,848
Business Loan 71 0 0 20,000 894
Total Liabilities 9,645 1,100 0 260,000 22,478
ADD Population vs. General Low Income Population
For the most part, the participant population in ADD has been selected to be at 200% of the
federal income-poverty guidelines or below (some exceptions have been made, particularly in
high cost-of-living environments such as San Francisco).  Within this guideline, participants are
associated with or recruited by the various sponsoring organizations.  Thus, ADD participants
are likely to reflect the populations served by these organizations.  As reported earlier, these
organizations represent a wide range of community development, social service, financial
service, housing, and other organizations, all of which have a community development or anti-
poverty mission.  Another key feature of ADD participants is that, in response to an IDA
program announcement, they have come forward to participate.  Because ADD participants
choose to participate, it is likely that the personal characteristics of ADD participants differ
systematically from the personal characteristics of the general low income population and even
from the overall populations served by the sponsoring organizations.  In this discussion, we
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highlight some of the key differences between the ADD population and the overall U.S.
population at or below 200% of the income-poverty line.1
The ADD population has a greater percentage of females than the general low income
population:
Gender ADD Population General Low Income Population
Female 78% 59%
Male 22% 41%
Compared to the general low income population, the ADD population has fewer Caucasians,
more African Americans, fewer Latinos, and more “other:”
Race/Ethnicity ADD Population General Low Income Population
Caucasian 41% 64%
African American 40% 16%
Latino 12% 16%
Other   7%   4%
The ADD population differs from the general low income population in having more people who
are single and never married, and fewer people who are married:
Marital Status ADD Population General Low Income Population
Single, never married 46% 28%
Married 24% 42%
Widowed, divorced, separated 30% 30%
The ADD population is much more highly educated than the general low income population:
Education ADD Population General Low Income Population
Did not complete high school 15% 35%
High school diploma or GED 27% 39%
Attended college 38% 18%
Graduated college 20%   8%
                                                
1 Comparison statistics use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  These
data (which come from the ninth wave of the 1993 SIPP panel) refer to September 1995.  The sample includes
individuals 18 years old and older who were living in households with income at or below 200% of the appropriate
official poverty threshold.  To obtain annual household income, we multiplied household income for the month of
September by 12.  Data on employment status refer to characteristics as of the first week of September 1995.  The
“bank use” variable identifies individuals living in households that had a checking or savings account in the first
quarter of 1995.  The data are weighted by person-level weights provided by the Census Bureau.
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The ADD population has a much higher proportion of people who are employed:
Employment ADD Population General Low Income Population
Employed full-time 59% 31%
Employed part-time 25% 11%
Unemployed involuntarily 11%   6%
Not employed voluntarily   5% 52%
The ADD population has a greater proportion of people with a checking and/or savings account:
Bank Use ADD Population General Low Income Population
Banked 80% 67%
Unbanked 20% 33%
Overall, perhaps the best way to describe the ADD population is that it is a “working poor”
population as opposed to a general low income population.  This occurs by design—most
programs in ADD are targeting the working poor, and so a very high proportion of the
participants are working.  This is probably a large part of the explanation for the higher level of
education in the ADD population and for the higher proportion of people who are banked
compared to the general low income population.
The higher proportion of women, the higher proportion of African Americans, and the higher
proportion of people who are single and never married in ADD, compared to the general low
income population, reflects the populations served by the sponsoring organizations.  These
markers of disadvantage (female, black, and single) suggest that, among the working poor
population, somewhat more disadvantaged people are participating in ADD.
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8.  Enrollment, Savings, and Withdrawals
In this section we present the following information aggregated across all 14 IDA programs:
• IDA enrollment, by quarter and cumulative
• IDA savings, cumulative
• Number of participants who made matched withdrawals, cumulative
• Matched withdrawals amounts, cumulative
• Participants' use of withdrawals
• Intended use of IDA account
In the chart for IDA savings, three figures are reported.  Participant savings refers to deposits by
participants (minus unapproved withdrawals, plus interest).  Matching funds are defined as the
match rate multiplied by participant savings.  Total IDA is defined as participant savings plus the
matching funds.  Total IDA measures the total amount of resources accumulated through















Sept 97 Dec 97 Mar 98  June 98 Sept 98 Dec 98 Mar 99 June 99













Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
Table 8.2  IDA Enrollment, Cumulative
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Participant Savings $3,300 $59,968 $186,665 $378,708 
Matching Funds $4,329 $112,356 $366,042 $741,609 
Total IDA $7,629 $172,324 $552,707 $1,120,317 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
















Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99






Participant Withdrawals $0 $715 $14,496 $52,688
Partner Match $0 $1,189 $24,890 $96,651
Total Matched Withdrawals $0 $1,904 $39,386 $149,339
Dec. 97  June 98  Dec. 98  June 99
Table 8.5  Matched Withdrawal Amounts, Cumulative
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Table 8.6  Participants' Use of Matched Withdrawals
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Table 8.7  Intended Use of IDA Account
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Discussion
Enrollment in ADD (Tables 8.1 and 8.2) began rather slowly with 4 enrollees between July and
September 1997, but after one year enrollment was running at over 200 per quarter, a level
roughly maintained through June 30, 1999.  The mean and median enrollment period for
participants is 9 months.  This enrollment pattern is typical of many IDA program start-ups; it
often takes some months to recruit the first participants, but once people learn about the program
and see their friends in it, enrollment tends to pick up rapidly.  ADD program sponsors no longer
talk about recruitment as a problem.  The total enrollment at June 30, 1999 was 1,326 and the
enrollment goal for ADD is 2,000.
As shown in Table 8.3, participant savings had reached $378,708 by June 30, 1999 (net of
unapproved withdrawals, including interest).  Matching funds for these savings were $741,609,
almost 2:1 compared to savings, reflecting the typical match rate in ADD.  (See Table 6.9 for
variations in match rates.)  Total IDA accumulation had reached $1,120,317.
A total of 92 IDA participants made matched withdrawals by June 30, 1999 (Table 8.4) and these
matched withdrawals totaled $149,339 (Table 8.5).  Participants used matched withdrawals
(Table 8.6) for microenterprise (33%), home purchase (27%), home repair (20%), and post-
secondary education (13%).  This pattern is different from the overall intended uses of IDAs
(Table 8.7); 55% of participants intend home purchase, 17% intend post-secondary education,
and 17% intend microenterprise.  Looking at intended use of IDAs by program (see Appendix
A), it appears that the sponsoring organizations significantly influence intended use (e.g., there
are more intended uses for home ownership in housing organizations).  We believe early
withdrawals for microenterprise are common because small sums may be used for small
businesses, whereas larger amounts are usually required for home purchases.
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9.  Saving Outcomes
Measures of Six Saving Outcomes1
In order to analyze saving in IDA programs, we have thought carefully about different aspects of
saving.  No single measure of saving tells us all that we want to know, but together, the six
measures defined below describe different aspects of how participants save.  The measures cover
the amount of accumulated saving, the regularity (in time and in amount) of deposits, and the
closeness of actual saving behavior to the savings goals of the program.  A running example
illustrates the computation of each measure.
Participant savings.  Participant savings are defined as all deposits and interest minus
unapproved withdrawals.  Equivalently, it is the account balance on the date of data collection
plus matched withdrawals.  Thus, participant savings count financial assets held in an IDA
program as well as assets converted from financial assets in the IDA program to other types of
approved assets.
The higher participant savings, the greater the accumulated assets.  The measure does not
account, however, for the length of participation, for the timing of deposits or withdrawals, nor
for different savings goals among participants or programs.
To illustrate the measure, Table 9.1 shows activity for a hypothetical IDA account.  The
evolution of the account balance through time is pictured in Figure 9.1.  The example participant
opened the account on January 1.  The match rate was 2:1, and the annual maximum potential
matched deposit was $300.  The first deposit of $100 was on February 1.  On March 1, $1.00 of
interest (a monthly rate of 1 percent) was credited to the account.2  On April 1, there was an
unapproved withdrawal of $25 and an interest credit of $1.01.  On May 1, the participant
deposited $50, and $0.77 in interest was credited.  Finally, on June 1, five months after the
account was opened, interest of $1.28 was credited, and the example participant closed the
account with a matched withdrawal of $127.78.
Participant savings in the example were thus $129.06, deposits ($100 + $50 = $150) plus interest
($1.00 + $1.01 + $0.77 + $1.28 = $4.06) less unapproved withdrawals ($25).
Table 9.1  Activity in a Hypothetical IDA Account
Date Deposit ($) Interest ($) Matched withdrawal ($) Unapproved withdrawal ($) Balance ($)
Jan. 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Feb. 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
March 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 101.00
April 1 0.00 1.01 0.00 25.00 77.01
May 1 50.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 127.78
June 1 0.00 1.28 129.06 0.00 0.00
Note: The annual maximum potential matched deposit is $300.  For the purposes of this example, the monthly
interest rate is 1%.  The match rate is 2:1.
                                                          
1 The CSD research team developed saving outcome measures.  Mark Schreiner clarified, expanded to include
lumpiness and proportion of savings goal over time, and wrote this section.
2 Interest of one percent per month is unrealistically high, and is used here only to illustrate the saving outcome
measure.
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Average monthly deposit.  Average monthly deposit is defined as participant savings divided
by the number of months of participation.  Unlike participant savings, average monthly deposit
does control for the length of time that a participant has had the opportunity to save.
The example participant was in the IDA program for 5 months, and participant savings was
$129.06, so average monthly deposit was $25.81, or $129.06 / 5.
Deposit regularity.  Deposit regularity is defined as the number of months in which a deposit
was made divided by the number of months in which a deposit was possible.  If a participant
made a deposit each month, then the ratio would be 1.00.  As a participant misses months, the
ratio gets smaller, although it cannot get smaller than zero.  Deposit regularity indicates to what
extent participants save steadily through time.  For the purpose of this measure, deposits of
accrued interest are not counted as deposits.
The example participant made deposits in 2 of 5 months of participation.  Deposit regularity was
thus 0.4, or 2 / 5.
Deposit lumpiness.  While deposit regularity measures the steadiness of deposits in terms of
time, deposit lumpiness measures the steadiness of deposits in terms of amount.  Deposit
lumpiness is defined as the biggest single deposit divided by the average monthly deposit.  If a
participant made equal-sized deposits each month, then deposit lumpiness would be 1.00.  If
some deposits are bigger than the others, or if some months have no deposits, then the ratio
increases away from 1.00.



























































































Figure 9.1  Evolution of Hypothetical Account Balance
B
A
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The biggest single deposit in the hypothetical example was $100.  The average monthly deposit
(without accrued interest) was $30, derived as $150 (the sum of the $100 deposit and the $50
deposit) divided by the 5 months of participation, $150 / 5.  Deposit lumpiness is then 3.33,
found as $100 / $30.  This means that the biggest actual deposit ($100) was 3.33 times as large as
the hypothetical equal-sized monthly deposit ($30) that would have been needed to produce the
same total deposit ($150).
Proportion of savings goal.3  The proportion of savings goal is defined as the ratio of the
average monthly deposit to the monthly savings goal.  The monthly savings goal is taken as one-
twelfth of the annual maximum potential matched deposit, as set by the program.  Thus the
proportion of savings goal indicates the closeness of actual saving behavior to the behavior that
would take full advantage of the incentives offered by the program.  A ratio of 1.00 implies that
on average, a participant saved the maximum matchable amount.
For the example participant, the monthly savings goal is $25, which is the annual maximum
potential matched deposit divided by 12, $300 / 12.  Because average monthly deposit was
$25.81, the proportion of savings goal was 1.03, or $25.81 / $25.  The participant saved more
than the monthly goal and yet still had all savings matched because participation lasted for less
than a year and because match-eligibility is based not on actual months of participation but on
expected years.
It should be noted that the savings goal is set by the program and values less than 1.00 on
proportion of savings goal still represent positive savings.  As a comparison, if a person opened
an IDA and saved the maximum of $2,000 in only five years out of ten, she would have a
proportion of savings goal of 0.50, but she would still have IRA savings.
Proportion of savings goal over time.3  The proportion of savings goal over time is defined as
the number of dollar-months saved divided by the number of dollar-months that would have been
saved had the participant made a deposit equal to the annual maximum potential matched deposit
on the first day of each year.  (A dollar-month is a dollar held in an account for a month.  For
example, a deposit of 2 dollars withdrawn after three months is six dollar-months of saving.)
The proportion of savings goal over time is the only measure to account for both the size and the
timing of deposits.  For example, if a participant deposited the annual maximum potential
matched deposit on the first day of the year and did not withdraw it, then the proportion of
savings goal over time would be 1.00.  If, on the other hand, the participant waited until the last
day of the year to make the same deposit, the ratio would be almost zero.  Finally, if the
participant made equal-sized deposits each month such that their total was the annual maximum
potential matched deposit, then the ratio would be about 0.50.  All else constant, early deposits
increase the proportion of savings goal over time more than do equal-sized later deposits.
In the example, the number of dollar-months saved is $405.80, the sum of the start-of-month
balances (0 + $100 + $101.01 + $77.01 + $127.78).  Ignoring interest, the number of dollar-
months that would have been saved had the participant deposited the annual maximum potential
matched deposit on the first day would be $1,500, or $300 + $300 + $300 + $300 + $300.  Thus
the proportion of savings goal over time is 0.27, or $405.80 / $1,500.  In Figure 9.1, this is the
                                                          
3 The word goal is used here to represent the IDA program goal as defined by the maximum matchable amount of
savings.  It does not mean participant goal.
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ratio of area A to area A + B.  If the participant had made the $100 deposit on Jan. 1 instead of
on Feb. 1, then, ignoring interest, the number of dollar-months saved would increase to $505.80.
Although this change in the timing of deposits does not affect the other five measures of saving,
the proportion of savings goal through time increases to 0.34 ($505.80 / $1,500).
As defined here, proportion of savings goal over time would not be expected to have high values
in an IDA program.  As stated above, a value of 0.50 would represent regular monthly saving in
relation to program goals.  Also, “lumpy” savers may wait to save toward the end of the year,
which would greatly reduce their performance in this measure (though they still have savings).












    Monthly Deposit .505***
Deposit Regularity .291*** .365***
Deposit Lumpiness .069* -.169*** -.635***
Proportion
    of Savings Goal .449*** .824*** .355*** -.180***
Proportion of Savings
    Goal Over Time .611*** .377*** .219*** -.005 .595***
Note: Total sample size is 1,326.  For deposit lumpiness, the sample size is 1,306 due to missing data.
Pearson r correlations significant at the following levels:
*<.05.  **<.01.  ***<.001.
Before further analysis of these measures of saving outcomes for ADD participants, we should
ask if they are empirically distinct.  The matrix of correlation coefficients (Table 9.2) above finds
a strong relationship between average monthly deposit and proportion of savings goal (.824); a
negative relationship between deposit regularity and deposit lumpiness (-.635); a relationship
between participant savings and proportion of savings goal over time (.611); a relationship
between proportion of savings goal and proportion of savings goal over time (.595); and
relationship between participant savings and average monthly deposit (.505).  These
intercorrelations are expected.  Only the highest one, where r = .824 and r2 = .679, suggests that
the variables are measuring substantially the same thing.
Measures of Saving Outcomes Across ADD Programs
On the following pages, we take a closer look at these six saving outcome measures at the 14
IDA programs separately and at all programs together.  IDA programs are identified by a number
because our purpose is not to focus on particular programs but rather to show the variation across
programs in the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation values for each
outcome measure.  All saving outcome data include 79 ADD participants who have saved
nothing4 and 107 “dropouts.”5  (These two groups overlap.)
                                                          
4 In ADD, participants can have a bank statement with no deposits.
5  See Chapter 13 for discussion of dropouts.
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Table 9.3  Participant Savings in Dollars
Program N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
1    55 508.14 401.65 0.00 1,422.22 413.32
2    85 311.65 164.00 0.00 2,252.92 386.86
3   101 269.38 238.81 0.00 853.06 217.80
4   107 137.76 75.68 0.00 527.52 154.01
5    82 341.22 344.02 0.00 738.25 219.58
6    87 296.50 180.24 0.00 2,006.18 361.58
7    36 195.60 211.72 0.00 368.80 108.50
8   151 502.23 412.22 0.00 1,497.51 422.61
9   101 159.45 80.14 0.00 1,121.79 186.65
10    92 210.63 96.46 0.00 867.44 235.83
11    90 104.62 65.16 0.00 571.41 122.22
12    97 299.23 243.55 0.00 946.64 227.96
13   110 235.34 120.04 0.00 1,503.69 312.33
14   132 347.40 261.27 0.00 1,133.00 291.05
All Programs 1,326 285.60 181.19 0.00 2,252.92 309.18
Participant savings varies quite a lot by IDA program because different programs have different
savings goals and expectations and because programs started at different times.  Across all
programs, the median participant in ADD had savings of $181, and the largest amount of savings
was $2,253.  The size of the standard deviations suggests that participant savings vary quite a bit
across participants, but of course this measure does not control for the length of participation.
Table 9.4  Average Monthly Deposit in Dollars
Program N Mean Median Minimum* Maximum Standard Deviation
1    55 61.32 62.13 0.00 250.18 54.18
2    85 28.18 21.48 0.00 109.06 25.94
3   101 24.61 23.49 -4.17 86.52 16.83
4   107 17.05 11.27 0.00 60.14 16.63
5    82 23.35 25.46 0.00 738.25 12.05
6    87 30.44 25.39 0.00 147.50 27.58
7    36 13.15 15.14 -10.91 20.49 6.71
8   151 33.31 31.09 -6.94 97.43 26.38
9   101 48.73 25.72 0.00 490.23 70.93
10    92 24.97 16.95 0.00 289.15 35.22
11    90 38.43 17.65 0.00 571.41 81.31
12    97 31.00 30.44 0.00 105.18 17.88
13   110 31.47 16.14 0.00 520.03 68.61
14   132 51.86 56.57 0.00 142.89 32.93
All Programs 1,326 33.29 23.48 -10.91 571.41 43.70
*Minimum values are sometimes negative, reflecting net unapproved withdrawals during the period.
Average monthly deposit is a useful measure because it does control for length of participation in
the IDA program.  Across all programs, the median was $23 and the mean was $33.  The median
varied from a low of $11 at one program to a high of $62 at another, indicating large differences
across programs.  Different programs have different monthly savings goals.
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Table 9.5  Deposit Regularity
Program N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
1    55 0.57 0.50 0.08 1.00 0.31
2    85 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.31
3   101 0.59 0.60 0.06 1.00 0.26
4   107 0.53 0.54 0.00 1.00 0.30
5    82 0.73 0.80 0.13 1.00 0.25
6    87 0.62 0.61 0.13 1.00 0.28
7    36 0.64 0.64 0.13 1.00 0.25
8   151 0.72 0.76 0.07 1.00 0.25
9   101 0.84 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.23
10    92 0.61 0.60 0.00 1.00 0.29
11    90 0.64 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.31
12    97 0.79 0.85 0.25 1.00 0.20
13   110 0.65 0.70 0.08 1.00 0.32
14   132 0.71 0.74 0.11 1.00 0.24
All Programs 1,326 0.66 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.29
Across all programs, deposit regularity has a median value of 0.70, indicating that the typical
IDA participant makes a deposit in seven out of every ten months.  The median varies across
programs from a low of 0.50 to a high of 1.00.
Table 9.6  Deposit Lumpiness
Program N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
1    55 4.22 3.17 1.00 13.00 3.27
2    82 4.15 3.00 1.00 15.00 3.23
3   101 3.90 2.91 1.00 16.00 3.09
4    99 3.67 2.91 1.00 11.41 2.19
5    82 2.80 2.40 1.00 8.00 1.53
6    87 4.14 3.58 1.00 11.21 2.54
7    36 3.26 2.77 1.00 8.00 1.98
8   151 4.73 3.75 1.00 14.51 3.35
9   100 2.02 1.60 1.00 5.86 1.17
10    91 3.28 2.87 1.00 9.00 1.89
11    83 2.05 2.00 1.00 6.25 1.09
12    97 2.25 2.13 1.00 4.80 0.94
13   110 3.57 2.62 1.00 13.00 2.69
14   132 2.44 2.05 1.00 9.00 1.35
All Programs 1,326 3.33 2.50 1.00 16.00 2.49
Deposit lumpiness has a median value of 2.50, indicating that, for the typical participant, the
largest deposit is 2.50 times the average monthly deposit.  Across IDA programs, median values
range from 1.60 (less lumpy) to 3.58 (more lumpy).  The maximum values show that some
individuals occasionally save very large amounts relative to average amounts, with a high
lumpiness value of 16.00.
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Table 9.7  Proportion of Savings Goal
Program N Mean Median Minimum* Maximum** Standard Deviation
1    55 0.74 0.75 0.00 3.00 0.65
2    85 0.40 0.24 0.00 2.09 0.40
3   101 0.59 0.56 -0.10 2.08 0.40
4   107 0.49 0.34 0.00 1.70 0.46
5    82 0.69 0.75 0.00 1.67 0.36
6    87 0.73 0.61 0.00 3.54 0.66
7    36 0.88 1.01 -0.73 1.37 0.45
8   151 0.53 0.49 -0.11 1.56 0.42
9   101 0.78 0.41 0.00 7.84 1.13
10    92 1.07 0.52 0.00 6.94 1.21
11    90 0.69 0.45 0.00 9.17 1.16
12    97 0.74 0.73 0.00 2.52 0.43
13   110 0.77 0.48 0.00 12.48 1.64
14   132 0.95 0.98 0.00 2.86 0.61
All Programs 1,326 0.71 0.59 -0.73 12.48 0.84
  *Minimum values are sometime negative due to net unapproved withdrawals during the period.
**Maximum values are high if participants have been in the IDA program only a short period but made large
deposits (e.g., the amount matchable for the whole year) and some participants save beyond the amount matchable.
Proportion of savings goal measures how much IDA participants are saving compared to the
program’s annual or monthly target.  Overall, the median value is 0.59.  In other words, the
typical IDA participant saved 59 cents for every dollar she could save and have matched.  The
medians range widely across programs from a low of .34 to a high of 1.01.
Table 9.8  Proportion of Savings Goal Over Time
Program N Mean Median Minimum Maximum* Standard Deviation
1    55 0.25 0.16 0.01 0.98 0.23
2    85 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.74 0.19
3   101 0.28 0.26 0.02 0.68 0.16
4   107 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.74 0.20
5    82 0.38 0.42 0.02 0.67 0.17
6    87 0.30 0.20 0.01 1.95 0.32
7    36 0.54 0.54 0.07 0.97 0.24
8   151 0.31 0.27 0.01 1.76 0.24
9   101 0.18 0.08 0.00 1.43 0.23
10    92 0.53 0.26 0.02 2.24 0.61
11    90 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.85 0.16
12    97 0.31 0.26 0.03 1.23 0.21
13   110 0.19 0.13 0.01 1.04 0.20
14   132 0.31 0.27 0.01 0.95 0.21
All Programs 1,326 0.28 0.22 0.00 2.24 0.28
*Maximum values exceed 1.00 when participants have been in the IDA program only a short period but have made
large deposits.
For the proportion of savings goal over time, the overall median is 0.22, and the mean is 0.28.
This means that, in terms of dollar-months of resources moved through time via an IDA
program, the typical participant held between one-fourth and one-fifth as much in her account as
she would have if she had made a deposit equal to the total annual matchable amount on the first
day of each year.  Again, variation across programs is large, with the lowest program median at
0.08 and the highest program median at 0.54.
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10.  Program Characteristics and Saving Outcomes
In this chapter, we begin to analyze the relationship between characteristics of programs and
saving outcomes, using bivariate analysis (program characteristics are defined in Chapter 6).
These, bivariate tests measure the strength of the statistical relationship of a given program
characteristic with a given average saving outcome, not controlling for any other variable such as
other program characteristics or participant characteristics.  The probability value, or p value,
associated with each test is the likelihood that the observed relationship is the result of chance
rather than the result of a “true” relationship.  Suppose, for example, that the age of the IDA
program has no real effect, positive or negative, on participant deposits.  In a sample of IDA
programs, however, the programs with high participant savings might, by chance, happen to be
older programs.  As the sample size increases, the probability that participant savings would
continue to be high for older programs falls, unless the two truly have a relationship.  The t
statistic and the p value measure the probability that two variables have no relationship and that
any relationship observed in a given sample is due simply to chance.  The p value is a function of
the t statistic; the larger the absolute value of the t statistic, the smaller the p value.  Furthermore,
the smaller the p value, the greater the likelihood that the relationship observed is “real” and not
happenstance.  For example, a p value of .05 indicates that the probability is no more than 5%
that there is not a relationship between the two variables.
Several cautionary notes are in order: First, a statistically significant relationship does not imply
that one variable causes the other.  For example, a bivariate test may indicate that the age of the
program is positively related to average participant savings, but this finding does not imply that
program age per se increases saving.  It may be that participants in older programs save more
because older programs tend to be located in less-disadvantaged areas and thus serve less-
disadvantaged participants.  Or perhaps a third variable (say, the availability of funds from local
donors) causes both an increase in the experience of programs (because programs in areas with
many donors do not go bankrupt) and an increase in the match rate (because more funds are
available for matches) that then causes participants to save more.
Second, statistically “insignificant” findings may still be important findings.  For example, if
average monthly savings does not vary with the income-poverty ratio of participants, then this
result would have important implications for efforts to target IDAs to the poor.
Third, p values are affected by sample size.  With very small samples, it is quite difficult to
obtain statistical significance, even if relationships are strong; with very large samples, it is
unusual not to obtain statistical significance.  A sample size of 14 (as in the program-level
analyses) is very small.  A sample size of 1,326 (as in the participant-level analyses) is
moderately large, but not so large that one would expect every relationship to be significant.
Fourth, statistically significant results are not necessarily significant in a practical or public-
policy sense.  For example, it may be that older programs induce more savings than younger
programs, but policy cannot speed up time and cause programs to age more rapidly.  (Of course,
if age is a proxy for skills built by experience, then public policy might usefully search for ways
to improve skills that do not require simply the passage of time.)
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Fifth, p values required for statistical significance are a convention and they are somewhat
arbitrary.  The analyses here define “statistical significance” as a p value of .10 or below, .05 or
below, or .01 or below.  This assumes that program characteristics are not related to saving
outcomes, and it requires a very high degree of certainty (90%, 95% or 99%) before stating that
there is a true relationship.  For the purposes of policy, however, it may be enough to know, for
example, that each year of program age increases average monthly savings by $1 with 80%
certainty (p value of 0.20).
Table 10.1 shows the bivariate correlations between a number of program characteristics and the
six measures of saving outcomes.  The measures of saving outcomes are averaged across
participants at the program level.

















Age of Organization .33 .11 .26 -.05 .024 .41
Age of Program .13 -.42 .09 .12 .30 .64**
Economic Education Hours -.11 -.23 -.34 .06 -.36 -.05
Average Match Rate -.20 -.47* -.12 -.07 .09 .44
Wait Period .30 .37 .32 -.23 .21 -.10
Average Monthly Deposit Goal .37 .71*** -.11 .12 -.44 -.69***
Average Number of Participants .51* -.08 .17 .47* -.44 -.10
Average Income Poverty Level .36 .24 .18 .15 .29 .15
Participants’ Affiliation with
Organization
.09 .55** .12 -.29 .07 -.40
Organizational Size .37 .35 -.07 .35 -.50* -.38
IDA FTEs -.02 .32 .28 -.09 -.36 -.43
Average IDA FTEs -.34 .30 .16 -.37 -.07 -.31
IDA Expenses .17 .48* .00 .13 -.37 -.46*
Average IDA Expenses -.08 .55** -.09 -.14 -.11 -.41
Marketing Activity -.26 .06 .31 -.24 .45* .12
Pearson r correlations significant at the following levels:
*p<.10.  **p<.05.  ***p<.01.
Note:  The p<.10 level of significance is used here because of the small number of programs (N=14).
The unit of analysis is the program, so there are 14 data points.  Given this small sample size, we
would not expect many significant correlations between program characteristics and average
saving outcomes.  Indeed, only 12 of 96 of the correlations in Table 10.1 are statistically
significant at the 0.10 level.  This is about how frequently we would expect to find statistically
significant correlations due to chance.
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Given these facts, we do not place much weight on the size or statistical significance of the
bivariate correlation coefficients in Table 10.1.  Nor do we report a multivariate analysis of these
program characteristics and saving outcome measures, because the small N makes the results
very questionable.
Instead, the results are useful mainly as a guide to suggest which program characteristics may
influence saving outcomes and thus should be included in the multivariate analysis (Chapter 12).
For that analysis, we will include the following nine program variables:  age of organization, age
of program, economic education hours, average monthly deposit goal, number of participants,
participants’ affiliation with organization, organizational size, average IDA FTEs, and average
IDA expenses.
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11.  Participant Characteristics and Saving Outcomes
We turn next to participant characteristics and saving outcomes (participant characteristics are
defined in Chapter 7).  We first present results of bivariate statistical tests, then we estimate a
multivariate model for each saving outcome with participant characteristics as independent
variables.
The bivariate tests measure the strength of the statistical relationship between a given participant
characteristic and a given saving outcome, not controlling for any other variable.  At the
participant level, we have 1,326 data points.  As sample size increases, a given level of statistical
significance is much easier to obtain and may be less indicative of practical or policy
significance (see the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of the interpretation of these
statistical tests).
Table 11.1 shows Pearson r correlations between participant characteristics that are measured
continuously and the six measures of saving outcomes.

















Age .15*** .07* .17 *** -.10*** .07** .12***
Number of Adults .03 .02 .04 -.05 .05 .10**
Number of Children .03 .04 -.03 .06* -.001 -.001
Dependency Ratio .001 .02 -.07* .08** -.02 -.05
Income Poverty Level .13*** .05 .07** -.03 .06* .11***
Total Assets .20*** .10** .12*** -.05 .13*** .17***
Financial Assets .09** .05 .06 -.03 .09** .10***
Net Worth .15*** .05 .08** -.03 .09** .12***
Total Liabilities .15*** .08** .10*** -.05 .10*** .13***
Consumer Debt/
Income Ratio
-.02 .02 .04 -.06* .02 -.01
Economic Education
Hours
.10** .18*** .10** -.16*** .16*** .11**
Pearson r correlations significant at the following levels:
*p <.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Note: The total sample size is 1,326.  Some analyses use slightly smaller samples due to missing data.  Economic
Education hours are reported for only 776 participants.
Of the 66 correlations in Table 11.1, 38 are statistically significant, 20 of these at the .001 level.
We highlight overall patterns: First, deposit lumpiness appears to behave somewhat differently
than the other saving outcomes.  Many of the correlations for deposit lumpiness are negative,
while most of the other correlations are positive.  In addition, participant characteristics that are
significantly related to other saving outcomes are less likely to be related to deposit lumpiness,
and participant characteristics that are associated with deposit lumpiness tend not to be
associated with other saving outcomes.
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Second, several participant characteristics tend to be significantly and positively related to
several saving outcomes.  These are age, income poverty level, total assets, net worth, total
liabilities, and hours of economic education taken.  On the other hand, several participant
characteristics seem not to be related to most saving outcomes.  These are number of children,
number of adults, the dependency ratio, and the consumer debt/income ratio.  We reexamine
these relationships later in the multivariate analyses.
The remaining tables in this chapter present bivariate relationships between saving outcomes and
categorical participant characteristics.  For dichotomous participant characteristics (i.e., of
residence, gender, and bank use), we computed t statistics.  A t statistic reveals whether the mean
values for two groups on a particular saving outcome are significantly different in a statistical
sense.  For participant characteristics with three or more categories (i.e., educational attainment,
employment status, race/ethnicity, welfare status, intended use of IDA savings, and actual use of
IDA savings), we performed analyses of variance.  An analysis of variance indicates whether
there is, overall, a significant relationship between a given participant characteristic and a given
saving outcome.  When analyses of variance revealed significant relationships, we also
performed post-hoc tests, tests that identify which particular groups have different mean saving
outcome values.  For example, if an analysis of variance revealed that education is significantly
related to average monthly deposit, a post-hoc test may indicate that participants with college
degrees have significantly higher average monthly deposits than participants without high school
degrees.




(N=207) t value p value
Participant Savings 290 260 1.67 .098
Average Monthly Deposit 34 27 3.83*** .000
Deposit Regularity .66 .69 -1.93 .055
Deposit Lumpiness 3.38 3.11 1.39 .166
Proportion of Savings Goal .71 .70 .39 .697
Proportion of Savings Goal
Over Time
.28 .31 -1.93 .055
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Table 11.2 shows that the average monthly deposit for urban residents ($34) is significantly
higher than the average monthly deposit for rural residents ($27).  Very likely this is explained
by the fact that some rural programs have lower monthly savings goals.  For the other saving
outcomes, there are no statistically significant differences between urban and rural residents.
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t value p value
Participant Savings 278 313 1.610 .108
Average Monthly Deposit 34 32 -.473 .636
Deposit Regularity .66 .66 .179 .858
Deposit Lumpiness 3.3 3.3 -.399 .690
Proportion of Savings Goal .71 .68 -.470 .638
Proportion of Savings Goal Over Time .28 .29 .172 .863
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Table 11.3 indicates that there are no statistically significant differences between males and
females for any of the saving outcomes.





t value p value
Participant Savings 315 171 8.14*** .000
Average Monthly Deposit 35 25 3.58*** .000
Deposit Regularity .68 .59 4.62*** .000
Deposit Lumpiness 3.3 3.5 -1.44 .152
Proportion of Savings Goal .75 .56 3.33** .001
Proportion of Savings Goal Over Time .30 .22 4.46*** .000
*p<.05.  ** p<.01.  ***p <.001.
Note:  Bank use measures whether participants had checking or saving account at their enrollment.
At the bivariate level, having a checking and/or savings account is consistently related to
participants’ saving outcomes (Table 11.4).  Compared to those who were “unbanked,” the
“banked” participants had significantly higher mean values for participant savings, average
monthly deposit, deposit regularity, proportion of savings goal, and proportion of savings goal
over time.













F value p value
Participant Savings 185 270 279 394 19.10*** .000
Average Monthly Deposit 25 32 34 41 5.69** .001
Deposit Regularity .62 .66 .66 .71 3.76* .011
Deposit Lumpiness 3.34 3.18 3.49 3.17 1.46 .223
Proportion of Savings Goal .55 .68 .70 .89 6.60*** .000
Proportion of Savings Goal
Over Time
.22 .25 .29 .36 11.69*** .000
*p <.05.  **p <.01.  *** p <.001.
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Analyses of variance indicate that the mean values of all saving outcomes except deposit
lumpiness vary significantly by educational attainment (Table 11.5).  Post-hoc tests reveal that
college graduates have significantly higher values for average monthly deposits and deposit
regularity than participants with less than a high school degree.  College graduates also have
significantly higher values than the other three groups for participant savings, proportion of
savings goal, and proportion of savings goal over time.  Participants with high school degrees
and those who attended college also have significantly higher participant savings than those with
less than a high school degree.  Finally, participants who attended college have significantly
higher values for proportion of savings goal over time than those with less than a high school
degree.  In sum, at the bivariate level, education appears to be related to saving outcomes, except
deposit lumpiness.  Education increases the amount and regularity of savings, both in an absolute
sense and relative to savings goals.













F value p value
Participant Savings 305 292 261 177 7.244*** .000
Average Monthly
Deposit
35 36 31 20 5.267*** .000
Deposit Regularity .67 .69 .69 .57 6.162*** .000
Deposit Lumpiness 3.4 3.2 2.8 3.4 1.923 .124
Proportion of Savings
Goal
.72 .78 .69 .49 4.335** .005
Proportion of Savings
Goal Over Time
.30 .28 .27 .21 3.659* .012
*p <.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Analyses of variance also indicate that the mean values of all saving outcomes except deposit
lumpiness vary significantly by employment status (Table 11.6).  Post-hoc tests reveal that
participants who were involuntarily unemployed have significantly lower values for participant
savings, average monthly deposit, deposit regularity, and proportion of savings goal than those
who were employed full-time or part-time.  Participants who were involuntarily unemployed also
have a significantly lower value for proportion of savings goal over time than those who were
employed full-time.  In sum, at the bivariate level, employment status seems to be related to
saving outcomes, except deposit lumpiness.  Involuntary unemployment decreases the amount
and regularity of savings, both in an absolute sense and relative to savings goals.
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F value p value
Participant Savings 325 231 307 340 9.864*** .000
Average Monthly Deposit   36   28   35   41 4.356** .005
Deposit Regularity .69 .62 .69 .66 6.415*** .000
Deposit Lumpiness 3.39 3.38 3.08 3.15 .832 .476
Proportion of Savings Goal .76 .64 .74 .76 2.148 .092
Proportion of Savings Goal
Over Time
.30 .27 .27 .31 1.195 .310
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Analyses of variance indicate that the mean values of three saving outcomes—participant
savings, average monthly deposit, and deposit regularity—vary significantly by race/ethnicity
(Table 11.7).  Post-hoc tests reveal that African-American participants have significantly lower
values for average monthly deposit and deposit regularity than Caucasian participants.  They also
have significantly lower participant savings than the other three groups.  Mean values of deposit
lumpiness, proportion of savings goal, and proportion of savings goal over time do not vary by
race/ethnicity.  In sum, at the bivariate level, African-American participants appear to save less
and to save less regularly.








F value p value
Participant Savings 260 337 284 6.626** .001
Average Monthly Deposit   31   37   34 2.042 .130
Deposit Regularity .62 .71 .68 11.159*** .000
Deposit Lumpiness 3.18 3.43 3.30 1.135 .322
Proportion of Savings Goal .68 .77 .71 1.108 .331
Proportion of Savings Goal Over Time .27 .32 .28 3.24* .039
*p <.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Analyses of variance indicate that the mean values of three saving outcomes—participant
savings, deposit regularity, and proportion of savings goal over time—vary significantly by
marital status (Table 11.8).  Post-hoc tests reveal that married participants have significantly
higher mean values for participant savings and proportion of savings goal over time than
participants who were never-married, and that participants who were never-married have
significantly lower values for deposit regularity than the other two groups.  Mean values for
deposit lumpiness, average monthly deposit, and proportion of savings goal do not vary
significantly by marital status.  In sum, participants who are single and never-married appear to
save less and to save less regularly.
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F value p value
Participant Savings 116 310 295 13.84*** .000
Average Monthly Deposit   19   40   33 6.75** .001
Deposit Regularity .60 .71 .66 4.67* .100
Deposit Lumpiness 2.59 3.14 3.41 4.39* .013
Proportion of Savings
Goal
.47 .87 .71 6.03** .002
Proportion of Savings
Goal Over Time
.17 .28 .29 7.46** .001
*p <.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Analyses of variance indicate that the mean values of all saving outcomes vary significantly by
welfare status (Table 11.9).  Post-hoc tests reveal that current TANF recipients have significantly
lower values for deposit lumpiness than participants who have never received TANF or AFDC.
Current TANF recipients have significantly lower values for participant savings, average
monthly deposit, deposit regularity, proportion of savings goal, and proportion of savings goal
over time than participants who were former TANF/AFDC recipients and participants who have
never received TANF or AFDC.  There are no significant differences in saving outcomes
between former TANF/AFDC recipients and participants who have never received
TANF/AFDC.  In sum, being a welfare recipient is associated with less positive saving
outcomes.  However, being a former welfare recipient is not.
















F value p value
Participant
Savings




33 31 35 36 31 23 .62 .686
Deposit
Regularity
.64 .69 .65 .70 .81 .64 4.04** .001
Deposit
Lumpiness
3.4 3.5 3.6 3.0 2.6 3.1 2.41* .035
Proportion of
Savings Goal




.27 .32 .27 .34 .31 .26 2.93* .012
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
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Analyses of variance indicate that the mean values of three saving outcomes—deposit regularity,
deposit lumpiness, and proportion of savings goal over time—vary significantly by participants’
intended use of IDA savings (Table 11.10).  Specifically, participants who intend to use their
IDA savings for retirement make deposits more regularly than participants who intend to use
their IDA savings for home purchase or education.  Also, participants whose intended IDA use is
microenterprise have a significantly higher mean value for proportion of savings goal over time
than participants who intend to use their IDA savings for home purchase.


















F value p value
Participant
Savings




  72   59   70   65   50   46 .505 .772
Deposit
Regularity
.72 .85 .60 .69 .94 .71 3.17* .011
Deposit
Lumpiness









.54 .36 .31 .52 .28 .35 2.23 .058
*p <.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Note: There are a total of 92 participants who reported actual use of IDA. Compared with general participants, this
subgroup had much higher mean values of all six dependent variables.
Analyses of variance and post-hoc tests show that participants who actually used their IDAs for
home repair or retirement have significantly higher deposit regularity than participants who used
their IDAs for post-secondary education (Table 11.11).  There are no significant differences in
the other saving outcomes by actual use of IDA.
Next, we use ordinary least squares regression to estimate a multivariate model for each saving
outcome (Table 11.12).1  These models include all of the above participant characteristics as
independent variables.  They reveal the strength of the statistical relationship between a given
participant characteristic and a given saving outcome, controlling for other participant
characteristics in the model but not controlling for any other variables.
                                                          
1 Ordinary least squares regressions are used here and in Chapter 12 (as opposed to tobit analysis) because we have a
small percentage of zero values on saving outcome measures.  Of 1,326 ADD participants, including “dropouts” (see
Chapter 13), only 79 or 6% have saved nothing.
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Intercept 99.41 7.47 0.433*** 4.809*** 0.314 0.105
Female -16.07 2.08 0.012 0.105 0.032 0.020
Urban Residence 87.13** 11.54** -0.015 0.467* 0.091 -0.0081
Race/Ethnicity
  (White)
  African-American -85.68*** -9.23** -0.028 -0.374* -0.113* 0.001
Latino or Hispanic -14.69 -1.44 0.034 -0.624* -0.0009 -0.014
  Other 9.61 4.73 -0.013 -0.359 -0.0021 0.020
Age 2.91** 0.199 0.004*** -0.017* 0.0043 0.0025**
Married 0.424 0.140 0.032 -0.036 -0.012 -0.012
Education
  (College Graduate)
  Less than High School -142.1*** -10.10* -0.040 0.032 -0.230** -0.095**
  High School Graduate -79.78** -5.92 -0.014 -0.072 -0.193** -0.070**
  Attended College -90.89*** -8.45** -0.041 0.331 -1.75** -0.053*
Employment Status
  (Employed Full-Time)
  Employed Part-Time 22.01 1.78 0.033 -0.256 0.073 0.002
  Unemployed
Involuntarily
-52.40 -8.54* -0.036 -0.123 -0.134 -0.039
  Not Employed
Voluntarily
-37.59 -2.87 0.006 -0.538 -0.037 -0.027
Number of Children 18.75** 2.19* -0.003 0.114* 0.016 0.0075
Number of Adults 10.87 2.40 0.024 -0.299* 0.094* 0.052***
Income Poverty Level 41.07* 2.95 0.028 -0.281* 0.074 0.038*
Welfare Status
  (Never Received
AFDC/TANF)
  Current TANF Recipient -107.78** -8.76 0.010 -1.14*** -0.084 -0.074
  Former AFDC/TANF
Recipient
29.72 3.97 0.074** -0.319 0.116 -0.0035
Banked 42.39 7.06* 0.048* -0.433 0.06 0.0094
Total Assets 0.0012** 0.00007 0.0000005 0.000002 0.000002 0.0000009*
Financial Assets -0.002 0.00004 -0.0000005 0.00001 0.000003 0.000001
Consumer Debt/Income
Ratio
-0.636 0.023 0.0006 -0.097* 0.0004 -0.0000002
Net Worth 0.0007 -0.00003 0.0000008 -0.000005 -0.0000004 -0.0008
R2 0.133 0.069 0.076 0.053 0.059 0.079
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.050 0.058 0.034 0.040 0.060
F 7.591*** 3.682*** 4.099*** 2.733*** 3.108*** 4.254***
N 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,147 1,165 1,165
*p<.05.    **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Note:  N values are less than 1,326 due to missing data for some variables.  Categories in parentheses are reference
groups to which other categories are compared.
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The F statistic for each of the six multiple regression models is significant at the 99% confidence
level, indicating that it is very unlikely that all of the observed relationships occurred by chance.
However, R2  values for these models are small, ranging from 0.05 to 0.11.  In other words, the
models explain only 5% to 11% of the variance in the saving outcome measures.  The most
predictive model, which is for participant savings, explains only 11 percent of the variance.
Again, we will try not to over-interpret these results, but some patterns in the multivariate
models may be worth noting:
• Urban residents may have better saving outcomes than rural residents.
• Being African-American appears to be negatively related to several saving outcomes.
• Age appears to be negatively related to deposit lumpiness and positively related to
several other saving outcomes.
• Education appears to be strongly related to savings amounts and reaching savings goals.
• Number of children may be positively related to several saving outcomes.
• Number of adults may be negatively related to deposit lumpiness and positively related to
proportion of savings goal and to proportion of savings goal over time.
• Those with more income (i.e., those with higher income poverty levels) appear to save
more.
• Current TANF recipients appear to save less than others.
• Those with checking and savings accounts outside of the IDA program (those who are
“banked”) appear to save more per month and to save more regularly.
These findings, across more than 1,100 IDA participants, are suggestive, but still tentative.  In
the next chapter, we look at individual and program characteristics together.
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12. Participant and Program Characteristics
and Saving Outcomes
This chapter examines saving outcomes while controlling for both participant characteristics and
program characteristics.  Because the multivariate regression controls for all these factors at
once, the results are less likely than those of Chapter 11 to be due to omitted variables and are
more likely to be close to the “true” relationships.



















Intercept -416.23*** 3.752 0.191* 5.01*** 0.615* -0.118
Female 0.434 2.182 0.0045 0.259 0.04 0.023
Urban Residence 46.86 5.37 -0.011 -0.075 0.068 0.029
Race/Ethnicity
  (White)
  African-American -67.52** -9.74** -0.0081 -0.15 -0.195** -0.033
  Latino or Hispanic -7.5 -4.4 0.025 -0.305 -0.129 -0.04
  Other -15.84 1.42 -0.0071 -0.275 -0.0307 0.0083
Age 2.703** 0.161 0.0033*** -0.015* 0.0047* 0.0027**
Married -1.18 1.71 0.024 -0.108 0.01 -0.016
Education
  (College Graduate)
  Less than High School -136.32*** -8.96* -0.054 0.102 -0.257** -0.107***
  High School  Graduate -74.19** -3.75 -0.016 -0.084 -0.180** -0.078**
  Attended College -106.35*** -7.88* -0.053* 0.319 -0.190** -0.068**
Employment Status
  (Employed Full-Time)
  Employed Part-Time 28.74 2.82 0.059** -0.336 0.068 -0.0025
  Unemployed Involuntarily -58.61 -6.52 -0.012 -0.183 -0.148 -0.061*
  Not Employed Voluntarily -47.89 -2.14 0.018 -0.473 -0.12 -0.072
Number of Children 10.8 1.62 -0.0044 0.081 0.023 0.0113
Number of Adults 11.28 1.74 0.026 -0.237* 0.065 0.041**
Income Poverty Level 23.76 1.43 0.021 -0.310* 0.036 0.028
Welfare Status
  (Never Received
AFDC/TANF)
  Current TANF Recipient -68.11 -14.67** -0.0066 -0.672* -0.103 -0.025
  Former AFDC/TANF
Recipient
9.85 6.26 0.070** -0.484* 0.105 -0.03
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Banked 12.23 5.354 0.035 -0.486* 0.084 0.0177
Total Assets 0.00095* 0.000047 0.0000005 -0.0000022 0.0000014 0.00000066
Financial Assets -0.00091 0.000063 -0.00000013 0.000013 0.000003 0.0000013
Consumer Debt/Income
Ratio
-0.497 0.0103 0.00041 -0.0082 0.00058 -0.00047
Net Worth 0.00066 0.000019 0.00000017 -0.0000058 -0.000000036 -0.00000036
Program
Characteristics
Age of Organization 3.571** 0.186 0.0043** -0.045*** -0.00069 0.0038**
Age of Program 17.69*** 0.157 0.0070* 0.054* 0.0082 0.013***
Economic Education
Hours
0.761 -0.564** -0.0039** -0.0064 -0.0032 0.0047**
Average Monthly Deposit
Goal
3.88** 0.440** 0.00022 -0.0011 -0.013*** -0.0067***
Number of Participants 1.024 -0.221 -0.00057 0.014 -0.00066 0.00147
Participants’ Affiliation
with Organization
84.67* 21.56*** 0.23*** -1.54*** 0.520*** 0.118**
Organizational Size 0.55 0.031 0.00075 0.0034 -0.00018 -0.00016
Average IDA FTEs -2169.23* -97.5 5.367*** -40.62*** -6.22* -3.115***
Average IDA Expenses 0.0331 -0.0052 -0.0019*** 0.013** 0.0031* 0.00165**
R2 0.238 0.132 0.153 0.142 0.111 0.182
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.107 0.129 0.117 0.086 0.158
F 11.028*** 5.378*** 6.387*** 5.748*** 4.411*** 7.847***
N 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,147 1,165 1,165
*p<.05.  **p<.01. ***p<.001.
Note: Categories in parentheses are reference groups to which other categories are compared.  N values are less than
1,326 due to missing data for some variables.
The null hypotheses that the regression models explain none of the variance in saving outcomes
are rejected (all the F statistics are statistically significant).  The models explain between 11%
and 24% of the variance in the dependent variables.  Although R2 values in this range may not be
considered impressive for some types of models, they are informative for models of individual
saving outcomes.  Saving is a complex behavior; nearly all constraints and choices affect saving,
often in subtle or difficult-to-observe ways.  Models that attempt to capture such complex
behavior have values for R2 in the range observed here.  In any case, the goal of the analysis is
less to understand all facets of saving behavior than it is to inform policy and to build knowledge
about how IDAs can help the poor to save.  The models can do this even if they do not contain
all of the factors that affect saving.  Moreover, this data set does not allow us to ask about overall
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impact of IDA programs because all ADD participants are in the program.  It could be (and
indeed it seems likely) that the IDA program itself has large impacts on saving outcomes.  We
will be able to answer this question in the future with experimental data.
It should be noted that the 1,165 participants modeled here were in 14 programs, and, within a
given program, program characteristics do not vary across participants.  This means that the nine
effects of program characteristics are estimated based on much less extensive information than
are the effects of participant characteristics.
For several reasons, much of the discussion below focuses on the effects of characteristics on
average monthly deposits.  First, unlike the measure of participant savings, the measure of
average monthly deposit controls for the length of participation.  Second, the units of
measurement of average monthly deposit are much simpler to grasp than, for example, the units
of measurement of the proportion of savings goal over time.  Third, although deposit regularity
and deposit lumpiness are both very important, they are less directly related to the goal of asset
accumulation.  Moreover, it is not yet clear whether or in what ways regularity and lumpiness are
positive or negative.  Fourth, the difference between average monthly deposit and the proportion
of the savings goal depends on the savings goal, and savings goals is a function of the program.
Fifth, the proportion of savings goal over time differs from average monthly deposit and from the
proportion of savings goal by a multiplicative factor and by the timing of deposits.  The
multiplicative factor is set somewhat arbitrarily by the program, and we do not have theoretical
reasons as to why certain variables would encourage participants to make deposits earlier or later
in their annual cycles.
Participant Characteristics
For the regression of participant characteristics on saving outcomes, the key results are as
follows:
• Gender does not have a large or statistically significant effect in any of the regressions.
• Residence does not have a statistically significant effect, although the estimate of the
effect of living in an urban area compared to a rural area is large (about $5 a month).
• African-Americans save smaller amounts than Caucasians.  In terms of average monthly
deposits, the statistical effect difference is about $9.70 per month.  Hispanics save about
$4.40 less than Caucasians, and Asian-Americans save about $1.40 more.  It should be
noted that we are not able to measure all variables that are correlated with race/ethnicity
and savings, and omitting these variables almost certainly causes the effects of
race/ethnicity to be overstated.  Particularly, the history of limited asset accumulation by
African-Americans due to active and continuing discrimination is not adequately
specified by a simple race/ethnicity variable (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995).  As one example
of this, African-Americans are much less likely to have assets in family and friendship
networks.
• Older participants save more and more regularly.  The effect of an additional year of age
is about $0.16, so a 10-year increase in age implies about $1.60 more of savings per
month.
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• Marital status has an effect of $1.70 a month more for married versus unmarried
participants, but the estimate is not statistically significant.
• The effects of education are large and tend to be statistically significant.  Compared to
college graduates, participants who attend some college save about $8 less a month.
High school graduates save about $4 less a month than college graduates and about $4
more a month than those participants who attended some college but who did not
graduate.  The latter result is surprising in that more education seems to depress saving,
perhaps because participants are still in school.  Participants who never finished high
school save about $9 a month less than college graduates.
• The part-time employed save about $2 more a month than the full-time employed,
although the effect is not statistically significant.  Those who are not employed
voluntarily save about $2 a month less than the full-time employed, and the involuntarily
unemployed saved about $7 a month less.  Again, none of the figures are statistically
significant, but the general pattern suggests that employment matters.
• An additional adult in the household increases average monthly deposits by about $1.70,
although again the relationship is not statistically significant.  The effect of an additional
child is similar.  Overall, the indication is that married participants and participants in
large households might save more and less lumpily.
• Income has a quite small and statistically insignificant effect on the amount of savings.
For example, a change in income from 100% of the poverty line to 200% of the poverty
line is estimated to increase average monthly saving by about $1.40.  For such a large
change in income, this is a small effect.  It is also small compared to the average size of
monthly savings (about $33).  Chapter 16 discusses further the relationship between
income and saving.
• The income poverty level has a large and statistically significant effect on deposit
lumpiness.  Higher-income participants are more likely to make deposits of similar sizes.
This may suggest that these participants, who are probably also more likely to be
employed, save by setting aside a relatively fixed amount each month, while poorer
participants save by depositing lumps of money when they arrive.  Either way, with
income held constant, both strategies seem to lead to similar levels of accumulation
through time.
• Compared to participants who never receive TANF or AFDC, former welfare recipients
save about $6 more a month (not significant), and current recipients about $15 less
(significant).  Former recipients also saved more regularly than participants who never
received TANF.  Although we can only speculate about the causes, these results may
suggest that the working poor do see IDAs as a worthwhile and effective way to stabilize
their long-term economic progress, while people on welfare may still find it difficult to
save even within the institutional structure of IDAs.
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• Participants who have bank accounts (beyond their IDAs) save with less lumpiness and in
greater amounts, about $5.40 a month more than those without bank accounts, although
only the effect on lumpiness is statistically significant.  This may suggest that
experienced savers take greater advantage of the incentives in IDAs, or it may signal that
IDA savings are simply reshuffled dollars from regular bank accounts.
• Total assets, financial assets, and net worth have very small and statistically insignificant
effects on saving outcomes.  For example, an increase in total assets of $1,000 would
increase average monthly saving by about $0.05.  This casts some doubt on the
hypothesis that IDA savings are funded by reshuffling resources away from other forms
of assets.  Even a $1,000 increase in financial assets would increase average monthly
savings by only $0.06.1
• The ratio of consumer debt to income has very small, statistically insignificant effects on
all saving outcomes.  This may suggest that participants do not borrow to fund deposits in
IDA accounts.2
In sum, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, household size, education, employment status, welfare
recipiency, and being banked all may effect saving outcomes.  In contrast, gender, location of
residence, income, and possession of other forms of assets do not seem to effect saving
outcomes.
Several unexpected relationships reflect factors that normally indicate disadvantage but are
related to higher saving in ADD.  In particular, participants with just a high-school diploma
saved more than those who attended some college; former welfare recipients saved more than
participants who had never been on welfare; and the part-time employed and the voluntarily not
employed saved about as much as the full-time employed.  These unexpected patterns may
suggest that IDAs have their biggest effects for the working poor, but more data on these
relationships are needed.
Program Characteristics
For the regression of program characteristics on saving outcomes, the key results are summarized
below.  Because we have only 14 programs from which to draw observations, we note statistical
significance but refrain from discussing sizes of effects or trying to explain the meaning of
results.
• The age (and presumably experience) of the sponsoring organization is positively associated
with participant savings and proportion of savings goal over time.  Age of organization is
also positively associated with deposit regularity, and negatively associated with deposit
lumpiness.
                                                          
1 There is collinearity among total assets, financial assets, and net worth.  However, omitting two of these and
including only total assets in the regression does not yield statistically significant results.
2 The issue of possible shifting of assets to put into IDA accounts is a key economic question which we cannot
answer until we have experimental data on all assets of participants and controls over time.  However, at this time,
we do not see signs of such shifting, and most ADD participants have few assets to shift (Table 7.20).
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• Age (and presumably experience) of the IDA program has very similar effects on saving
outcomes as does age of the organization, except that both deposit regularity and deposit
lumpiness appear to increase with age of the IDA program.  Overall, there is a strong
indication that age and experience matter.
• The number of economic education hours offered appears to increase the proportion of
savings goal over time, but it is negatively associated with average monthly deposit and
deposit regularity.
• The average monthly deposit goal appears to have a positive impact on participant savings
and average monthly deposit, but a negative impact on proportion of savings goal and
proportion of savings goal over time.  In other words, when programs set a high goal for
savings, it appears to increase savings, but participants also tend to fall short of the savings
goal.
• The IDA program size as measured by the average number of participants does not seem to
affect saving outcomes.
• The proportion of IDA participants who had an affiliation with the sponsoring organization
prior to the IDA program has consistent positive associations with saving outcomes, except
for deposit lumpiness, where the association is negative.  Overall, there is a strong indication
that prior relationships with participants matter.
• The size of the organization as measured by average organizational FTEs is not associated
with saving outcomes.
• The staffing of the IDA program as measured by average IDA FTEs is negatively associated
with participant savings, proportion of savings goal, and proportion of savings goal over
time.  It is positively associated with deposit regularity, and negatively associated with
deposit lumpiness.
• Average IDA expenses at the program level are positively associated with proportion of
savings goal and proportion of savings goal over time.  The are also positively associated
with deposit lumpiness, and negatively with deposit regularity.
Finally, we also ran a regression in which the nine measures of program characteristics were
replaced by a set of indicator variables, one for each program.  The intent was to test the
importance of unmeasured program-level effects.  Some programs do have effects on saving
outcomes, but the explanatory power is not greater than for the measured program
characteristics.  Also, the estimated relationships between participant characteristics and saving
outcomes are very similar to those reported in Table 12.1 and so are not presented here.
Reference
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13.  Attrition
Up to this point, the analyses have included both participants who stay in IDA programs as well
as participants who do not.  As of June 30, 1999, 107 of 1,326 participants (about 8%) had
dropped out.  In this chapter, we compare the characteristics of savers with the characteristics of
dropouts.  It is useful for policy purposes to know the characteristics of those who tend to be
both willing and able to take advantage of the structure of incentives institutionalized within IDA
programs.
Dropouts are defined as participants who have moved, died, or are no longer eligible, as well as
those who are not able to save or lost interest in the program.  (We combined dropouts who left
because of inability to save or because of lost interest with those who moved or died because the
characteristics of the two groups did not seem to differ.)
Savers are defined as participants who have reached their IDA goals or are still saving in ADD.
As a caveat, we note that the drop-out rate of 8% is probably under-reported in MIS IDA for
three reasons.  First, IDA staff may hope that a non-saver may save in the future and so are
reluctant to record her as a dropout.  Second, IDA staff may not realize that a participant has
dropped out.  Unless economic-education classes are required, the only record of IDA
participation appears as deposits in monthly account statements.  Even an active participant may
have spells of several months in a row without a deposit, and some participants may withdraw
some or all of their funds in an emergency only to replace them later.  Third, because of demands
from other responsibilities, in some cases IDA staff may not have updated known dropouts in
MIS IDA until after June 30, 1999.  Thus, the results and interpretation below may change when
more complete information on dropouts is available.
Table 13.1  Savers vs. Dropout:  Differences in Means for Continuous Measures
Savers
(N=1219)
Dropouts       
(N=107)
t value p value
Age 37 32 4.80*** .000
Number of Adults 1.48 1.44 .60 .546
Number of Children 1.73 1.46 1.78 .075
Dependency Ratio 1.30 1.18 1.01 .312
Income Poverty Level 1.18 1.12 .87 .386
Total Value of Assets 14,634 3,520 9.08*** .000
Financial Assets 1,889 323 5.90*** .000
Total Value of Liabilities 10,190 3,121 7.42*** .000
Consumer Debt/Income
Ratio
3.17 .98 4.39*** .000
Net Worth 4,366 428 5.55*** .000
Economic Education Hours 14.1 7.08 7.28*** .000
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
Table 13.1 presents the means of participant characteristics measured on a continuous scale for
both savers and dropouts.  In general, dropouts tend to be more disadvantaged than savers along
several dimensions.
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• Dropouts are about five years younger than savers, and the difference is statistically
significant.
• Dropouts have smaller households, although the difference is not statistically significant.
• Somewhat surprisingly, dropouts tend to have a lower dependency ratio, although the
difference is not statistically significant.
• Dropouts have less income, but not by much, and the difference is not statistically
significant.
• Compared to savers, dropouts have about one-third as much total assets, financial assets, and
total liabilities.  Savers also have about three times as much consumer debt, relative to their
income, and about ten times as much net worth.  It appears that IDA participation is more
difficult for people who lack some modicum level of assets.  This is a somewhat ironic
testament to the power of assets.
• Dropouts received about half as many hours of economic education as savers.  It could be
that more economic education effectively helps participants to stick with the program, but it
is also possible that dropouts receive less economic education because they drop out before
they can receive very much.
The key points regarding economic resources are that income does not seem to affect attrition,
but non-IDA assets do seem to be important.
We turn next to comparisons of savers and dropouts for categorical measures (Table 13.2).
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Table 13.2 compares the distributions of categorical variables between savers and drop-outs.
The p value and the Pearson Chi-square statistic measure the likelihood that the observed
differences between the distributions for the two groups could be due to chance rather than due
to a systematic relationship with the likelihood of dropping out.
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The results shown in Table 13.2 may be summarized as follows:
• Males and urban residents are more heavily represented among dropouts than are females
and rural residents by about 5 percentage points, although in both cases we are only 80%
certain that the effect is not due to chance.
• African-Americans are over-represented among dropouts, compared to Caucasians,
Hispanics, and Others.  The differences are close to significant (about 90% certainty).
• Urban residents are more represented among dropouts then among savers, though the
difference is not statistically significant.
• Compared to being married, divorced, separated, or widowed, having never married
increases the share of dropouts, compared to the share among savers.  The difference is
statistically significant.
• High-school graduates and college graduates are somewhat more likely to drop out than
those who attended some college, although the effects are not significant.  This pattern is
similar to that observed in Chapter 12 in which participants with “some college” saved less in
general than did high-school graduates.
• Full-time employment decreases the likelihood of dropping out; involuntary unemployment
increases it.  The effects are not likely due to chance.
• Former welfare recipients are about half as likely to drop out as are participants who have
never been on welfare, and the effect is statistically significant.  This may have positive
implications for IDAs as a welfare reform strategy.
• Participants with a bank account are slightly less likely to drop out than the unbanked,
although the difference is not statistically significant.
• Participants who intend to use their IDAs for home purchase or for microenterprise drop out
with less frequency than do participants who intend to use their IDA for post-secondary
education.  This may result from the fact that home buyers are often already affiliated with a
home-buyers program and thus receive more extensive support in their quest for their goals
and likely have already started to save and to commit themselves mentally to home purchase.
In the case of microenterprise, asset purchases are in smaller amounts and can take place
soon after starting an IDA account, so savers do not have to wait long to use this IDA
savings.  Post-secondary education, on the other hand, takes longer to “purchase.”
Some of the effects of participant characteristics on saving outcomes as described in previous
chapters could be due in part to the effects of participant characteristics on the likelihood of
dropping out.  In particular, former welfare recipients are less likely to drop out than are
participants who have never been on welfare, perhaps because the requirements for financial
education and other program rules seem heavy-handed to people who are not used to the welfare
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system.  This may explain why the measures of saving outcomes are on the whole more positive
for former welfare recipients than for people who have never been on welfare.
Furthermore, African-Americans are more likely to drop out than are other participants.  Given
the seemingly strong effects of assets on dropouts and the high possibility that African-
Americans are more likely to lack assets than are other ethnicities, being an African-American in
these bivariate comparisons may act as a proxy for lacking assets.  Again, the long history of
discrimination against African-Americans in asset-holding is not adequately specified by a single
variable indicating race/ethnicity.
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14.  Match Rate
Note that we do not include average program match rate in the regression models in Chapter 12,
because bivariate analyses in Chapter 10 indicate that match rate is not a useful variable for
understanding IDAs in ADD.  Of course, match rate is of great theoretical and policy importance
in IDAs or any matched savings program.  However, in ADD, match rates tend to be higher in
programs where the population is poorest and savings goals are lowest.  For example, the IDA
program at the Mountain Association for Community Economic Development (MACED),
located in a very poor rural county in Kentucky, has a match rate of 6:1, but expects participants
to save only $15 per month.  This is a program design decision responding to particular
conditions.  Program designs such as this lead, at the bivariate level, to a statistically significant
negative correlation between average match rate and average monthly deposit in ADD overall.
Under these circumstances, we are unable to say very much about the effects of program level
match rate on savings.  To put this in research language, the choice of match rate is sometimes
endogenous with the expected saving outcomes; as such it does not make sense as an
independent variable because it is not in fact independent.
When participant (individual level) match rates are added to the regression models that appear in
Chapter 12, very little changes in the overall results.  Nor is match rate related to participant
savings or average monthly deposit.  However, we do find an almost significant relationship
between match rate and proportion of savings goal (p = .052) and a significant relationship
between match rate and proportion of savings goal over time (p = .032).  Thus, controlling for
many other variables, match rate appears to be positively related to achieving savings goals.
We will know more about the effects of match rate when we have data from many more IDA
programs.  Based on the experience of ADD so far, match rate does not appear to be a major
factor in whether or how much IDA participants save.  This is perhaps similar to experiences in
401(k) retirement savings programs wherein, once participants sign up, a large portion tend to
save at the maximum matchable amount, even though match rate varies across employers.
Probably the more important issue regarding match rate in IDA programs is asset accumulation.
How large should the match be to lift IDA participants to a particular or general asset-building
goal?  In the MACED example above, it was decided that the match on $15 per month should be
6:1 or $90, for a total monthly accumulation of $105.  This program design was not made
thinking that a 6:1 match would be a strong incentive, but rather because a 6:1 match would be
needed for participants to reach meaningful asset accumulation goals.  (Many MACED
participants will use the money to repair their homes.  In Owsley County, Kentucky, many
people own homes, but the condition of the dwellings is often substandard.)  Thus, match rate in
ADD and other matched savings programs may be more about asset goals than about incentives
for saving.
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15.  Poverty and Saving
The finding in the bivariate analyses that, not controlling for other variables, people with lower
incomes save less in the IDA programs of ADD is expected, but it is misleading.  As we have
shown in the overall regression analyses, when controlling for other factors, income is not
associated with saving outcomes in the IDA programs of ADD.
Indeed, when we look at average monthly deposit and average monthly deposit divided by
monthly household income, a quite different picture emerges.  In Table 15.1 below, the median
monthly deposit of the group at 50% of the poverty line and below was $20.10, while the median
for the group at 176% to 200% of the poverty line was $25.30.  This is an income difference of
over 300%, but a savings difference of only 26%.
Table 15.1  Average Monthly Deposit and Average Monthly Deposit Divided by





Income Poverty Level Mean Median Mean Median
.50 and Below 29.10 20.10 0.083 0.040
.51 to .75 31.00 19.50 0.038 0.023
.76 to 1.00 30.60 22.60 0.031 0.023
1.01 to 1.25 36.60 22.50 0.029 0.018
1.26 to 1.50 35.80 28.00 0.025 0.018
1.51 to 1.75 31.60 24.10 0.020 0.015
1.76 to 2.00 38.20 25.30 0.020 0.013
Over 2.00 36.30 34.40 0.017 0.014
Total 33.30 23.50 0.033 0.019
Further insight is gained by looking at the average monthly deposit divided by household
monthly income (also shown in Table 15.1).  Here we find that the group at 50% of the poverty
line and below was saving a median of 4.0% of monthly income, while the group at 176 to 200%
of the poverty line was saving 1.3% of monthly income.  The mean values show even greater
differences (8.3% compared to 2.0%).  Thus, in the IDA programs of ADD, the very poorest
participants are saving at a far higher rate than those who are relatively well off.
It should be noted that the very poor may appear to save at a higher rate because they have
under-reported their incomes, but the level of under-reporting is likely to be small compared to
the large size of the saving rate differences across income levels.
These results are consistent with an institutional theory of saving, in which an institutional
structure (in this case, IDA programs) is more explanatory than individual characteristics and
constraints, even monthly income, in determining saving outcomes.  The savings match and
other IDA program features appear to have a strong effect on savings choices of very low income
IDA participants.  At the same time, the maximum matchable amount appears to be a
psychological “cap” on average monthly deposit for higher incomes.
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16.  Conclusions
Can the poor save through the institutionalized structure of supports and incentives provided by
IDAs?  The early MIS IDA data from ADD show that they can.  In 14 IDA programs run by 13
sponsoring organizations, 1,326 participants saved in IDA accounts.  In the 24-month period
leading up to June 30, 1999, the average participant in an average month saved about $33.  Given
that the average match was about 2:1, the average participant accumulated resources worth about
$100 a month through IDAs.
ADD has shown that the poor can use IDAs not only to save but also to accumulate assets.
Although the programs are still young and most participants have yet to make a withdrawal, 92
participants had made matched withdrawals for the purchase of assets for microenterprises,
homes or home repairs, post-secondary education, retirement investments, and job training.
The ADD Population
How similar is the ADD population to the U.S. population below 200% of the poverty line?  The
answer to this question matters because the positive outcomes described above may hold true
only for a small, self-selected segment of the low-income population.  It turns out that, compared
to the US low-income population, ADD participants are more likely to be female, African-
American, and never married.  ADD participants are more likely to have attended college or to
have a college degree and less likely to have dropped out of high school.  They are also more
likely to have a bank account and to be employed.  Thus, compared with non-participants with
similar incomes, ADD participants are more likely to be disadvantaged in terms of gender,
ethnicity, and marital status, but participants are less likely to be disadvantaged in terms of
education, employment status, and use of banks.  In sum, ADD seems to attract members of the
“working poor” who, compared to the U.S.  low-income population, are more disadvantaged in
some aspects and less disadvantaged in other aspects.
Participant Characteristics and Saving Outcomes
How do participant characteristics affect saving outcomes in IDAs?  Overall, results so far
suggest that income may matter for saving strategies (regular vs. lumpy), but not for asset
accumulation.  Relationships between the income poverty level and several measures of saving
outcomes are small and statistically insignificant.  Likewise, the income poverty level does not
seem to affect the likelihood of dropping out.  Although preliminary results do suggest that
higher income may be linked to more regular deposits and lower income may be linked to more
lumpy deposits, the particular saving strategy does not affect the amount accumulated through
time.
Moreover, very income-poor households save in IDAs at a higher rate than others.  Households
with income at half the poverty line or below saved, on average, 8% of their income in IDAs.
Households between 50% and 125% of the poverty line saved about 4% of their income in IDAs.
Households with incomes of 150% of the poverty line or more saved about 2% of their incomes
in IDAs.  This pronounced finding is consistent with the institutional theory of saving discussed
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in Chapter 2, wherein some combination of incentives, information, access, and facilitation in the
IDA program is the strongest determinant of saving, more influential than personal
characteristics, even income, in effecting amounts of saving.  This is in some ways analogous to
participants in a 401(k) retirement program saving up to the maximum rate matched, because
those are the program rules.
The result that poverty is associated with higher saving rates is consistent with some other
findings.  For example, participants who had received TANF or AFDC in the past tended to save
more and more regularly than did participants who had never received TANF or AFDC.
Furthermore, participants with a high-school diploma saved more and more regularly than did
participants who had attended some college but who had not graduated.  Likewise, participants
who worked part-time saved more and more regularly than did participants who worked full-
time.  In all three of these examples, participants who were less advantaged in some sense saved
more than did participants who were more advantaged.  These effects remain even when
controlling for program characteristics.  Overall, these results suggest that matched saving may
be an effective strategy for income-poor and disadvantaged populations, perhaps even a
particularly effective strategy.
Certain demographic characteristics may affect saving behavior.  For example, older participants
save more and more regularly.  This finding is expected due to life stage and responsibilities.
Younger adults typically have lower savings.
Race/ethnicity also matters.  The large and significant difference in saving between Caucasians
and African-Americans suggests that IDA programs may have to make special efforts to engage
African-Americans in saving and asset accumulation.  The history of exclusion and
discrimination in asset accumulation for African-Americans is reflected in these patterns.  For
example, it is very likely that African-Americans have fewer assets in family and friendship
networks.  Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that African-Americans are still saving an
average of about $28 per month in IDA programs.  The ratio of mean IDA savings between
Caucasians and African-Americans (36:28, or about 4:3) is vastly more equal than the
approximately 10:1 ratio in white vs. black net worth in the society overall.  Because most ADD
participants have very low net worth, after a few years of IDA participation the white-black gap
in net worth would be narrowed quite a lot.  This is not to say that race/ethnicity differences in
IDA savings should be downplayed, but to keep in mind that, even for African-Americans,
savings performance in ADD can only be considered a success.
Several types of personal characteristics do not seem to affect average monthly deposit.  For
example, saving patterns are similar for both men and women and for both urban and rural
residents.  Likewise, average monthly deposit is not affected by the levels of total assets,
financial assets, or net worth.  The ratio of consumer debt to income does not seem to affect
saving.  These preliminary results on the effects of financial assets and debt may suggest that
IDA deposits are truly new savings and not transfers of savings that would have taken place in
other forms.
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Program Characteristics and Saving Outcomes
How do program characteristics affect saving patterns in IDAs? The results at the program level
are not very robust because they are based on just 14 data points, i.e., one for each program.
Still, a common pattern is that IDA programs with greater age (and presumably more experience)
produce better saving outcomes.  Furthermore, participants who were already affiliated with the
sponsoring organization in some way seem to respond more to the incentives built into IDAs.
The effects of inputs in terms of financial education are mixed; preparing curricula and teaching
courses may divert staff from IDA activities that may have greater impacts, yet successful savers
seem to have taken more hours of classes than dropouts (this effect could be due to selection).
Overall, it seems likely that the IDA program itself has a very large effect on saving, stronger
than many personal characteristics, but we will not be able to say this with certainty until the
experimental evidence (comparison of IDA participants with a control group) is available.
In Sum
These results, based on MIS IDA data from the first two years of ADD, have broken new ground
in the study of saving by the poor.  The research is innovative empirically in the use of MIS IDA
to track savings behavior through time.  It is innovative theoretically in development of measures
that capture distinct aspects of saving behavior that are applicable to both poor and non-poor
households.
The MIS IDA data analyzed here show that the poor can save and accumulate assets through
IDAs.  On average, ADD participants have saved $33 per month and have accumulated $286
over an average of nine months.  With matching funds, the average accumulation is $845 (these
figures include non-savers and dropouts).  Although there are some differences in savings rates
by individual characteristics (e.g., age, race/ethnicity), the more striking result is that so many
ADD participants save so well.  Perhaps most noteworthy, amounts of saving vary little with
income, and the very poor save at a much higher rate than others.  If this finding persists, it may
lead to theoretical contributions and a re-thinking of savings policy for the poor.  At the moment,
however, these findings are preliminary.
Future Work
We do not yet know much about how or why the poor can save through IDAs.  Nor do the MIS
IDA data reveal much about whether IDAs help the poor to save more or to have greater asset
accumulation than they would have had in the absence of IDAs.  To inform development-based
policy with a focus on assets for the poor, we want to know which institutional features attract
the poor to IDAs.  Do the poor use IDAs because of the high rate of return they offer (due to the
match), because of the social and psychological incentives and opportunities they represent
(through staff and peer support for saving and by pointing out the importance of assets even for
the poor), and/or because of the opportunities to constrain their own choices (through regular
savings goals and implicit penalties for unmatched withdrawals)?
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The ADD design includes multiple evaluation methods meant to address precisely these
questions for which data from MIS IDA cannot provide an appropriate answer.  For example, we
are conducting in-depth interviews with participants to learn how they perceive IDAs and their
advantages and disadvantages.  The intent is to learn how and why the poor save through IDAs,
in their own words, teasing out social and psychological effects that cannot be derived from
statistical analysis.  Often, as in the surprising result that former recipients of TANF or AFDC
save more and more regularly than people who have never received TANF or AFDC, the
questions pursued in these interviews will be attempts to understand, confirm, or disprove the
preliminary results presented in this report.
A detailed implementation analysis at the program level will describe in qualitative terms the
difficulties and best practices of designing and setting up an IDA program.  This study is based
on reviews of program records and on interviews with IDA staff, participants, and funders.  The
operational and managerial issues faced by IDA programs affect the quality and longevity of the
IDA services used by the poor.  As part of the overall qualitative analysis, some attempt will be
made, in conjunction with data and insights from other evaluation methods, to determine how
different design elements (such as match rate, savings goals, and financial education) affect the
effectiveness of IDAs.
A financial benefit-cost analysis will quantify cash flows to determine whether IDAs are good in
purely financial terms from the points of view of various groups of stakeholders.  This is
important because each group of stakeholders (for example, participants, IDA staff, and federal
and state governments) has its own roles and its own goals.
Finally, an experimental design survey with random assignment in one IDA program will reveal
the extent to which IDAs increase saving and asset accumulation, as well as the impact of IDAs
on a wide variety of social and economic outcomes.  Abt Associates is conducting this survey.
Impact will be measured as the differences in outcomes between a treatment group with access to
IDAs and a control group without access.  This social experiment is innovative in its focus on
saving by the poor and its use of a survey instrument that has been crafted to measure “asset
effects,” that is, whether IDAs affect not only financial outcomes, but also participants’ thinking
and actions.




Participant Characteristics and Savings Patterns at Each IDA Program
In this appendix we summarize participant characteristics and savings patterns for each of the
IDA programs separately.  These are not intended so that one program should be compared
against others.  Such comparisons would not be very informative because each IDA program is
dealing with a different population, with different program designs, and  different program sizes
and levels of resources.  The patterns of individual characteristics and savings patterns are
nonetheless informative in describing particular circumstances and patterns of saving at the
different sites.
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Gender Children in Household
Female 64% No Children 20%
Male 36% 1 Child 27%
Residence 2 Children 18%
Urban 78% 3 Children 11%
Rural 22% 4 Children 13%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 11%
Caucasian 76% Adults in Household
African American 2% 1 49%
Latino or Hispanic 5% 2 42%
Asian or Pacific Islander 13% 3 9%
Native American 0% 4 0%
Other 4% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 0% .50 and Below 6%
20s 18% .51 to .75 19%
30s 49% .76 to 1.00 23%
40s 22% 1.01 to 1.25 21%
50 and Over 11% 1.26 to 1.50 17%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 8%
Single,-Never Married 31% 1.76 to 2.00 2%
Married 44% Above 2.00 4%
Divorced 16% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 7% Below $500 4%
Widowed 2% $500-$1,000 35%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 23%
Single with Children 38% $1,501 to $2,000 25%
Single without Children 18% Above $2,000 13%
Married with Children 42% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 2% Formal Employment 83%
Education Government Assistance 25%
Did Not Complete High School 10% Self Employment 18%
High School Diploma or GED 22% Child Support 24%
Attended College 33% Other 0%
Graduated College 35% Family/Friends 2%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 0%
Employed Full-time 58% Investment 2%
Employed Part-time 28% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 7% Never Received TANF/AFDC 98%
Not Employed Voluntarily 7% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 0%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $5,281.70 $20,412.60 $27,947.90 
Matching Funds $0.00 $10,564.40 $39,527.20 $55,641.70 
Total IDA $0.00 $15,846.10 $59,939.80 $83,589.60 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $474.70 $8,528.20 $17,366.00
Partner Match $0.00 $949.30 $17,056.40 $34,732.00
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $1,424.00 $25,584.60 $52,098.00













Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
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Alternatives Federal Credit Union (AFCU)
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 75% No Children 21%
Male 25% 1 Child 26%
Residence 2 Children 20%
Urban 38% 3 Children 20%
Rural 62% 4 Children 11%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 2%
Caucasian 73% Adults in Household
African American 17% 1 65%
Latino or Hispanic 4% 2 33%
Asian or Pacific Islander 1% 3 2%
Native American 0% 4 0%
Other 5% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 14% .50 and Below 13%
20s 16% .51 to .75 16%
30s 34% .76 to 1.00 19%
40s 28% 1.01 to 1.25 10%
50 and Over 8% 1.26 to 1.50 25%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 8%
Single,-Never Married 48% 1.76 to 2.00 5%
Married 22% Above 2.00 3%
Divorced 23% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 6% Below $500 12%
Widowed 1% $500-$1,000 30%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 26%
Single with Children 58% $1,501 to $2,000 21%
Single without Children 20% Above $2,000 11%
Married with Children 21% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 1% Formal Employment 70%
Education Government Assistance 29%
Did Not Complete High School 18% Self Employment 16%
High School Diploma or GED 13% Child Support 30%
Attended College 41% Other 22%
Graduated College 28% Family/Friends 3%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 3%
Employed Full-time 41% Investment 1%
Employed Part-time 27% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 15% Never Received TANF/AFCD 87%
Not Employed Voluntarily 17% Formerly Received TANF/AFCD 11%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $2,797.00 $12,476.60 $29,025.60 
Matching Funds $0.00 $8,315.10 $37,237.70 $84,125.40 
Total IDA $0.00 $11,112.10 $49,714.30 $113,151.00 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes Match withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0 $0 $0 $1,268.20 
Partner Match $0 $0 $0 $3,804.40 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0 $0 $0 $5,072.60 











Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99



















Intended Use of IDA Account
Appendix A   91
Center for Social Development
Washington University
Bay Area IDA Collaborative
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 86% No Children 43%
Male 14% 1 Child 23%
Residence 2 Children 19%
Urban 98% 3 Children 7%
Rural 2% 4 Children 5%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 3%
Caucasian 20% Adults in Household
African American 40% 1 56%
Latino or Hispanic 27% 2 30%
Asian or Pacific Islander 5% 3 9%
Native American 2% 4 4%
Other 6% 5 or more 1%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 3% .50 and Below 9%
20s 18% .51 to .75 15%
30s 38% .76 to 1.00 9%
40s 27% 1.01 to 1.25 13%
50 and Over 14% 1.26 to 1.50 11%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 13%
Single,-Never Married 67% 1.76 to 2.00 7%
Married 17% Above 2.00 23%
Divorced 9% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 6% Below $500 9%
Widowed 1% $500-$1,000 24%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 29%
Single with Children 46% $1,501 to $2,000 18%
Single without Children 37% Above $2,000 20%
Married with Children 11% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 6% Formal Employment 66%
Education Government Assistance 15%
Did Not Complete High School 17% Self Employment 21%
High School Diploma or GED 15% Child Support 8%
Attended College 48% Other 13%
Graduated College 20% Family/Friends 2%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 2%
Employed Full-time 58% Investment 1%
Employed Part-time 21% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 15% Never Received TANF/AFDC 84%
Not Employed Voluntarily 6% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 5%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $0.00 $13,996.60 $45,856.40 
Matching Funds $0.00 $0.00 $27,293.40 $86,708.30 
Total IDA $0.00 $0.00 $41,290.00 $132,564.70 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0 $0 $65.10 $7,059.50 
Partner Match $0 $0 $130.20 $14,089.10 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0 $0 $195.30 $21,148.60 











Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
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Capital Area Asset Building Corporation (CAAB)
Participants Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 78% No Children 25%
Male 22% 1 Child 31%
Residence 2 Children 22%
Urban 100% 3 Children 12%
Rural 0% 4 Children 3%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 7%
Caucasian 5% Adults in Household
African American 83% 1 67%
Latino or Hispanic 9% 2 32%
Asian or Pacific Islander 2% 3 1%
Native American 0% 4 0%
Other 1% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 7% .50 and Below 9%
20s 27% .51 to .75 8%
30s 33% .76 to 1.00 21%
40s 27% 1.01 to 1.25 12%
50 and Over 6% 1.26 to 1.50 8%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 17%
Single,-Never Married 67% 1.76 to 2.00 8%
Married 15% Above 2.00 17%
Divorced 13% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 5% Below $500 7%
Widowed 0% $500-$1,000 22%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 26%
Single with Children 64% $1,501 to $2,000 21%
Single without Children 21% Above $2,000 24%
Married with Children 12% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 3% Formal Employment 95%
Education Government Assistance 8%
Did Not Complete High School 13% Self Employment 1%
High School Diploma or GED 39% Child Support 2%
Attended College 34% Other 2%
Graduated College 14% Family/Friends 1%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 0%
Employed Full-time 68% Investment 0%
Employed Part-time 21% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 10% Never Received TANF/AFDC 94%
Not Employed Voluntarily 1% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 1%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $1,554.90 $6,986.50 $14,440.90 $26,490.60 
Matching Funds $1,363.10 $14,789.90 $34,908.60 $67,787.60 
Total IDA $2,918.00 $21,776.40 $49,349.50 $94,278.20 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $1,745.00 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $3,490.00 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $5,235.00 










Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
Number of Participants Who Made Matched Withdrawals, Cumulative
66
21
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Central Texas Mutual Housing Association (CTMHA)
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 66% No Children 28%
Male 34% 1 Child 27%
Residence 2 Children 32%
Urban 100% 3 Children 8%
Rural 0% 4 Children 5%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 0%
Caucasian 26% Adults in Household
African American 18% 1 58%
Latino or Hispanic 54% 2 37%
Asian or Pacific Islander 1% 3 3%
Native American 0% 4 2%
Other 1% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 4% .50 and Below 1%
20s 35% .51 to .75 3%
30s 42% .76 to 1.00 17%
40s 10% 1.01 to 1.25 18%
50 and Over 9% 1.26 to 1.50 17%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 18%
Single,-Never Married 36% 1.76 to 2.00 16%
Married 36% Above 2.00 10%
Divorced 19% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 8% Below $500 0%
Widowed 1% $500-$1,000 16%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 33%
Single with Children 44% $1,501 to $2,000 30%
Single without Children 21% Above $2,000 21%
Married with Children 28% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 7% Formal Employment 96%
Education Government Assistance 14%
Did Not Complete High School 24% Self Employment 3%
High School Diploma or GED 28% Child Support 11%
Attended College 31% Other 0%
Graduated College 17% Family/Friends 0%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 2%
Employed Full-time 67% Investment 0%
Employed Part-time 23% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 5% Never Received TANF/AFDC 100%
Not Employed Voluntarily 5% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 0%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $982.40 $8,380.90 $25,887.20 
Matching Funds $0.00 $1,904.70 $16,761.70 $50,948.70 
Total IDA $0.00 $2,887.10 $25,142.60 $76,835.90 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $1,074.00 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $2,148.00 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $3,222.00 











Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
Number of Participants Who Made Matched Withdrawals, Cumulative
59
37
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Central Vermont Community Action Council, Inc. (CVCAC)
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 78% No Children 26%
Male 22% 1 Child 31%
Residence 2 Children 26%
Urban 21% 3 Children 10%
Rural 79% 4 Children 5%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 2%
Caucasian 86% Adults in Household
African American 3% 1 56%
Latino or Hispanic 0% 2 43%
Asian or Pacific Islander 0% 3 1%
Native American 8% 4 0%
Other 3% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 3% .50 and Below 17%
20s 18% ..51 to .75 21%
30s 43% .76 to 1.00 25%
40s 30% 1.01 to 1.25 22%
50 and Over 6% 1.26 to 1.50 8%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 5%
Single,-Never Married 43% 1.76 to 2.00 2%
Married 23% Above 2.00 0%
Divorced 23% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 9% Below $500 18%
Widowed 2% $500-$1,000 38%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 35%
Single with Children 56% $1,501 to $2,000 6%
Single without Children 21% Above $2,000 3%
Married with Children 18% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 5% Formal Employment 74%
Education Government Assistance 52%
Did Not Complete High School 8% Self Employment 30%
High School Diploma or GED 17% Child Support 23%
Attended College 33% Other 5%
Graduated College 42% Family/Friends 9%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 1%
Employed Full-time 38% Investment 1%
Employed Part-time 54% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 8% Never Received TANF/AFDC 90%
Not Employed Voluntarily 0% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 2%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $95.10 $4,511.10 $15,515.10 $27,207.20 
Matching Funds $165.30 $6,174.80 $21,385.70 $46,299.10 
Total IDA $260.40 $10,685.80 $36,900.80 $73,506.30 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $733.10 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $935.00 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $1,668.10 











Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
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Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC) Program 1
Participants Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 74% No Children 15%
Male 26% 1 Child 25%
Residence 2 Children 26%
Urban 98% 3 Children 19%
Rural 2% 4 Children 8%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 7%
Caucasian 49% Adults in Household
African American 43% 1 60%
Latino or Hispanic 1% 2 37%
Asian or Pacific Islander 1% 3 3%
Native American 5% 4 0%
Other 1% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 0% .50 and Below 3%
20s 23% .51 to .75 11%
30s 35% .76 to 1.00 19%
40s 32% 1.01 to 1.25 15%
50 and Over 10% 1.26 to 1.50 24%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 12%
Single,-Never Married 32% 1.76 to 2.00 7%
Married 34% Above 2.00 9%
Divorced 26% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 6% Below $500 3%
Widowed 2% $500-$1,000 18%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 32%
Single with Children 54% $1,501 to $2,000 28%
Single without Children 13% Above $2,000 19%
Married with Children 31% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 3% Formal Employment 89%
Education Government Assistance 23%
Did Not Complete High School 8% Self Employment 13%
High School Diploma or GED 28% Child Support 17%
Attended College 47% Other 4%
Graduated College 17% Family/Friends 3%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 1%
Employed Full-time 83% Investment 3%
Employed Part-time 14% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 3% Never Received TANF/AFDC 78%
Not Employed Voluntarily 0% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 20%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $23,212.90 $47,345.40 $75,836.40 
Matching Funds $0.00 $35,299.50 $70,596.60 $115,299.00 
Total IDA $0.00 $58,512.40 $117,942.00 $191,135.40 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $240.00 $4,782.10 $15,576.70 
Partner Match $0.00 $240.00 $5,462.10 $19,134.60 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $480.00 $10,244.20 $34,711.30 












Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
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Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC) Program 2
Participants Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 79% No Children 22%
Male 21% 1 Child 19%
Residence 2 Children 34%
Urban 93% 3 Children 18%
Rural 7% 4 Children 4%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 3%
Caucasian 60% Adults in Household
African American 33% 1 70%
Latino or Hispanic 3% 2 27%
Asian or Pacific Islander 3% 3 3%
Native American 1% 4 0%
Other 0% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 1% .50 and Below 6%
20s 22% .51 to .75 10%
30s 34% .76 to 1.00 20%
40s 29% 1.01 to 1.25 22%
50 and Over 14% 1.26 to 1.50 20%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 9%
Single,-Never Married 24% 1.76 to 2.00 6%
Married 31% Above 2.00 7%
Divorced 41% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 0% Below $500 7%
Widowed 4% $500-$1,000 26%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 30%
Single with Children 50% $1,501 to $2,000 24%
Single without Children 19% Above $2,000 13%
Married with Children 28% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 3% Formal Employment 85%
Education Government Assistance 28%
Did Not Complete High School 10% Self Employment 20%
High School Diploma or GED 35% Child Support 19%
Attended College 32% Other 14%
Graduated College 23% Family/Friends 15%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 1%
Employed Full-time 85% Investment 2%
Employed Part-time 14% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 1% Never Received TANF/AFDC 94%
Not Employed Voluntarily 0% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 3%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $16,104.30 
Matching Funds $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $22,745.60 
Total IDA $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $38,850.00 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 









Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
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Heart of America Family Services (HAFS)
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 84% No Children 23%
Male 16% 1 Child 26%
Residence 2 Children 24%
Urban 100% 3 Children 11%
Rural 0% 4 Children 10%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 6%
Caucasian 15% Adults in Household
African American 38% 1 48%
Latino or Hispanic 41% 2 43%
Asian or Pacific Islander 1% 3 6%
Native American 1% 4 1%
Other 4% 5 or more 2%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 0% .50 and Below 14%
20s 19% .51 to .75 19%
30s 49% .76 to 1.00 16%
40s 22% 1.01 to 1.25 12%
50 and Over 10% 1.26 to 1.50 12%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 10%
Single,-Never Married 28% 1.76 to 2.00 7%
Married 31% Above 2.00 10%
Divorced 23% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 13% Below $500 14%
Widowed 5% $500-$1,000 25%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 25%
Single with Children 49% $1,501 to $2,000 18%
Single without Children 21% Above $2,000 18%
Married with Children 28% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 2% Formal Employment 78%
Education Government Assistance 31%
Did Not Complete High School 11% Self Employment 11%
High School Diploma or GED 30% Child Support 9%
Attended College 37% Other 9%
Graduated College 22% Family/Friends 1%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 4%
Employed Full-time 52% Investment 1%
Employed Part-time 21% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 16% Never Received TANF/AFCD 79%
Not Employed Voluntarily 11% Formerly Received TANF/AFCD 18%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $1,450.00 $7,485.90 $17,980.50 $27,980.40 
Matching Funds $2,600.00 $14,771.80 $35,698.30 $55,681.90 
Total IDA $4,050.00 $22,257.70 $53,678.80 $83,662.30 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $1,120.80 $1,810.90 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $2,241.60 $3,621.70 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $3,362.40 $5,432.60 












Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
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Gender Children in Household
Female 79% No Children 19%
Male 21% 1 Child 18%
Residence 2 Children 36%
Urban 100% 3 Children 20%
Rural 0% 4 Children 6%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 1%
Caucasian 69% Adults in Household
African American 12% 1 58%
Latino or Hispanic 14% 2 36%
Asian or Pacific Islander 2% 3 6%
Native American 1% 4 1%
Other 2% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 1% .50 and Below 9%
20s 28% .51 to .75 14%
30s 38% .76 to 1.00 15%
40s 30% 1.01 to 1.25 22%
50 and Over 3% 1.26 to 1.50 12%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 11%
Single,-Never Married 38% 1.76 to 2.00 9%
Married 26% Above 2.00 8%
Divorced 29% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 7% Below $500 6%
Widowed 0% $500-$1,000 24%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 24%
Single with Children 58% $1,501 to $2,000 30%
Single without Children 16% Above $2,000 16%
Married with Children 23% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 3% Formal Employment 78%
Education Government Assistance 28%
Did Not Complete High School 10% Self Employment 13%
High School Diploma or GED 27% Child Support 23%
Attended College 38% Other 11%
Graduated College 25% Family/Friends 6%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 1%
Employed Full-time 48% Investment 2%
Employed Part-time 29% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 14% Never Received TANF/AFDC 67%
Not Employed Voluntarily 9% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 30%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $200.40 $3,829.10 $11,004.20 $25,795.40 
Matching Funds $200.40 $3,333.20 $10,389.00 $22,495.20 
Total IDA $400.80 $7,162.30 $21,393.20 $48,290.60 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $500.00 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $500.00 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $1,000.00 
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Mountain Association for Community Economic Development
(MACED)
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 83% No Children 33%
Male 17% 1 Child 33%
Residence 2 Children 28%
Urban 0% 3 Children 6%
Rural 100% 4 Children 0%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 0%
Caucasian 100% Adults in Household
African American 0% 1 25%
Latino or Hispanic 0% 2 64%
Asian or Pacific Islander 0% 3 11%
Native American 0% 4 0%
Other 0% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 3% .50 and Below 8%
20s 22% .51 to .75 22%
30s 33% .76 to 1.00 17%
40s 25% 1.01 to 1.25 19%
50 and Over 17% 1.26 to 1.50 17%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 14%
Single,-Never Married 17% 1.76 to 2.00 3%
Married 58% Above 2.00 0%
Divorced 11% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 8% Below $500 5%
Widowed 6% $500-$1,000 28%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 53%
Single with Children 17% $1,501 to $2,000 11%
Single without Children 25% Above $2,000 3%
Married with Children 50% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 8% Formal Employment 86%
Education Government Assistance 42%
Did Not Complete High School 28% Self Employment 17%
High School Diploma or GED 41% Child Support 3%
Attended College 28% Other 3%
Graduated College 3% Family/Friends 0%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 3%
Employed Full-time 75% Investment 0%
Employed Part-time 17% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 3% Never Received TANF/AFDC 94%
Not Employed Voluntarily 5% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 3%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $2,102.90 $4,600.60 $7,041.70 
Matching Funds $0.00 $11,356.00 $26,565.60 $41,784.80 
Total IDA $0.00 $13,458.90 $31,166.20 $48,826.50 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
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Near Eastside IDA Program
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 72% No Children 32%
Male 28% 1 Child 17%
Residence 2 Children 28%
Urban 99% 3 Children 10%
Rural 1% 4 Children 7%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 6%
Caucasian 31% Adults in Household
African American 61% 1 69%
Latino or Hispanic 2% 2 28%
Asian or Pacific Islander 0% 3 1%
Native American 2% 4 2%
Other 4% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 12% .50 and Below 22%
20s 30% .51 to .75 17%
30s 33% .76 to 1.00 21%
40s 15% 1.01 to 1.25 19%
50 and Over 10% 1.26 to 1.50 16%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 4%
Single,-Never Married 60% 1.76 to 2.00 0%
Married 11% Above 2.00 0%
Divorced 22% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 7% Below $500 24%
Widowed 0% $500-$1,000 36%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 27%
Single with Children 58% $1,501 to $2,000 11%
Single without Children 31% Above $2,000 2%
Married with Children 10% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 1% Formal Employment 71%
Education Government Assistance 29%
Did Not Complete High School 31% Self Employment 3%
High School Diploma or GED 32% Child Support 7%
Attended College 31% Other 11%
Graduated College 6% Family/Friends 3%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 2%
Employed Full-time 40% Investment 0%
Employed Part-time 26% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 26% Never Received TANF/AFDC 91%
Not Employed Voluntarily 8% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 5%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $290.30 $7,103.40 $14,741.90 
Matching Funds $0.00 $870.90 $22,150.70 $43,859.70 
Total IDA $0.00 $1,161.20 $29,254.10 $58,601.60 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $3,133.00 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $9,391.60 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $12,524.60 
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Gender Children in Household
Female 78% No Children 27%
Male 22% 1 Child 26%
Residence 2 Children 23%
Urban 100% 3 Children 13%
Rural 0% 4 Children 5%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 6%
Caucasian 3% Adults in Household
African American 96% 1 65%
Latino or Hispanic 0% 2 22%
Asian or Pacific Islander 0% 3 10%
Native American 0% 4 2%
Other 1% 5 or more 1%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 6% .50 and Below 10%
20s 29% .51 to .75 18%
30s 37% .76 to 1.00 7%
40s 16% 1.01 to 1.25 13%
50 and Over 12% 1.26 to 1.50 14%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 12%
Single,-Never Married 63% 1.76 to 2.00 10%
Married 12% Above 2.00 16%
Divorced 15% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 7% Below $500 5%
Widowed 3% $500-$1,000 30%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 20%
Single with Children 63% $1,501 to $2,000 25%
Single without Children 25% Above $2,000 20%
Married with Children 10% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 2% Formal Employment 79%
Education Government Assistance 30%
Did Not Complete High School 12% Self Employment 13%
High School Diploma or GED 18% Child Support 7%
Attended College 50% Other 7%
Graduated College 20% Family/Friends 4%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 2%
Employed Full-time 61% Investment 0%
Employed Part-time 24% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 12% Never Received TANF/AFDC 66%
Not Employed Voluntarily 3% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 27%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $2,488.00 $11,894.40 $19,377.70 
Matching Funds $0.00 $4,975.90 $20,499.50 $29,980.30 
Total IDA $0.00 $7,463.90 $32,393.90 $49,358.00 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $2,421.70 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $4,804.70 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $7,226.40 











Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
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Women's Self-Employment Project (WSEP)
Participant Characteristics
Gender Children in Household
Female 96% No Children 13%
Male 4% 1 Child 17%
Residence 2 Children 22%
Urban 94% 3 Children 25%
Rural 6% 4 Children 12%
Race/Ethnicity 5 or more Children 11%
Caucasian 11% Adults in Household
African American 88% 1 69%
Latino or Hispanic 1% 2 22%
Asian or Pacific Islander 0% 3 9%
Native American 0% 4 0%
Other 0% 5 or more 0%
Age Income Poverty Level
Under 20 2% .50 and Below 22%
20s 21% .51 to .75 21%
30s 43% .76 to 1.00 20%
40s 26% 1.01 to 1.25 18%
50 and Over 8% 1.26 to 1.50 8%
Marital Status 1.51 to 1.75 2%
Single,-Never Married 72% 1.76 to 2.00 4%
Married 6% Above 2.00 5%
Divorced 12% Total Monthly Household Income
Separated 9% Below $500 14%
Widowed 1% $500-$1,000 29%
Household Type $1,001 to $1,500 31%
Single with Children 84% $1,501 to $2,000 14%
Single without Children 11% Above $2,000 12%
Married with Children 3% Household Income by Source*
Married without Children 2% Formal Employment 56%
Education Government Assistance 47%
Did Not Complete High School 15% Self Employment 29%
High School Diploma or GED 44% Child Support 13%
Attended College 31% Other 12%
Graduated College 10% Family/Friends 3%
Employment Status Pension or Retirement 1%
Employed Full-time 52% Investment 0%
Employed Part-time 32% Welfare Status
Unemployed Involuntarily 16% Never Received TANF/AFDC 34%
Not Employed Voluntarily 0% Formerly Received TANF/AFDC 29%




*Percentages do not sum to 100 because participants may have more than one source of income.
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Participant Savings $0.00 $0.00 $1,514.20 $9,415.50 
Matching Funds $0.00 $0.00 $3,028.40 $18,251.90 
Total IDA $0.00 $0.00 $4,542.60 $27,667.40 
Dec 97  June 98  Dec 98  June 99
*Includes matched withdrawals.
IDA Savings, Cumulative*
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Participant Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Partner Match $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Total Matched Withdrawals $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
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Appendix B
Evaluating ADD:  Purpose, Methods, Progress
The “American Dream Demonstration” (ADD) is the first systematic evaluation of IDAs.  The
purpose of ADD is to find out whether IDAs are successful, in what ways, and for whom.
Because IDAs are new and there is much to learn, evaluation is central to the purpose of ADD.
The ADD evaluation is multi-faceted; indeed, it may be one of the most thorough and
comprehensive evaluations of a social or economic demonstration.  The evaluation has been
designed by CSD with the advice of an expert Evaluation Advisory Committee.  The evaluation
employs multiple methods, each with a different purpose, and the evaluation will follow IDA
participants over six years (1997-2003).  These multiple methods are designed to look at ADD
from as many perspectives as possible and to gather timely data as the demonstration progresses
in order to inform IDA policy and program development outside of ADD.  (See Table B.1.)
Purposes of the ADD Evaluation
The ADD evaluation is intended to yield information in the following areas:
• An answer to the question: Do IDAs work?
• Best IDA program designs and practices.
• Models to guide state and federal IDA policy.
• Knowledge about saving and asset accumulation.
Features of the ADD Evaluation
The evaluation incorporates carefully designed procedures to enhance its quality:
• Guidance from an expert Evaluation Advisory Committee.
• Research designs that follow as much as possible from theoretical statements and that
explicitly seek alternative explanations.
• Multiple methods of evaluation, each designed for different purposes.
• Analyses that are based insofar as possible on hypothesis-testing but that also allow for
emergence of unanticipated findings.
Research Questions
The ADD evaluation seeks answers to the following questions:
• What are good design features for an IDA program?
• What are the barriers and facilitators in starting and operating a successful IDA program?
• What is the pattern of savings in IDAs?
• What affects saving behavior in an IDA program?
• What are IDA savings used for?
• What is the impact of IDAs on asset accumulation and the use of assets to meet life goals
(education, home ownership, starting a business, etc.).
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• What are the additional effects (social, psychological, and economic) of asset holding for
IDA participants and their families?
• What is the financial return of an IDA program to participants and society?
• What are the community-level effects of an IDA program?
Research Methods
The ADD evaluation uses eight research methods:
• Implementation assessment.
• Program monitoring.
• Experimental design survey.
• In-depth interviews with participants.
• Assessment of community level effects.
• Return on investment (or benefit-cost) analysis.
• Brief cross-sectional survey.
• Case studies of participants.
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Table B.1  Research Methods in ADD
Research
Type




To describe IDA programs-as-
implemented so that different
programs results can be
meaningfully compared and
communicated as lessons for
other IDA programs.
Case studies using program records,
guided narratives, interviews and focus
groups of staff and participants.





CSD Two-year study; completed








performance, and to collect
saving and basic individual-
level data on all participants
Periodic monitoring of IDA
participation and use of savings.  MIS
IDA monitoring software is being used
by each IDA program
(N=all participants and all programs)












data on IDA participation and
use, savings behavior, and the
effects of asset accumulation,
compared to a control group.
Random sample survey of 1,100 with
control group designed to test the
effects of IDA participation.
Location: at one large site.
Three waves of survey (years 2, 4, and
6).
CSD designed and pre-tested the
questionnaire.
Abt Associates is collecting data.
(N=1100)
Statistical Abt Associates Abt Associates will analyze
and report on the basic
policy impacts.
CSD will analyze and
report on questions
regarding savings




To add detail, examples, and
understanding to fixed-format
survey results.
Purposeful, small sample interviews,













Method one: undertake community
level assessment with social indicators
and visual assessments.
Method two: use individual level survey
questions to evaluate community
participation and involvement.










Assessment is being carried
out in Atlanta.  Survey
results will be analyzed by
CSD.
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Table B.1  Research Methods in ADD continued
Research
Type





To calculate IDA program
results in financial terms from
the perspectives of different
groups of stakeholders.
Identify program costs and outcomes
for participants and society that have
clear financial returns (using data from






CSD Calculations during year 5
(first follow-up year).
Brief Survey To assess IDA outcomes in a
cross-sectional survey.
Fixed format, short survey.
(N=400 to 500)
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Progress of the ADD Evaluation
Assessment of IDA program implementation.  Every six months for the past two years, we
have asked IDA programs to fill out an open-ended “guided narrative” that assesses many
aspects of program implementation and administration.  After reviewing this information, we
have undertaken a face-to-face interview with a representative from each of the 13 sponsoring
organizations.  All four rounds of data collection, both guided narratives and interviews, have
been successfully completed in September 1997, March 1998, October 1998, and March 1999.
Dr. Deborah Page-Adams of the University of Kansas, a CSD faculty associate, has led the
implementation-assessment team.  Dr. Ed Scanlon, now at the University of Washington in
Seattle, Freda Bady of CSD, and Lissa Johnson of CSD have helped carry out the interviews.  A
report on the first year of implementation is part of the Start-Up Evaluation Report. A final
implementation report on the first two years will be available in early 2000.
Monitoring/management information system (MIS IDA).  CSD had, as of June 1998,
collected data from Version 1.0 of MIS IDA.  The Start-Up Evaluation Report reflected data
collected from this version.  Since then, MIS IDA has been considerably upgraded. With the
advent of Version 2.0, MIS IDA became commercially available to non-ADD IDA programs.
The current version is 2.02.  Version 3.0 became available in January 2000.  MIS IDA has been
very successful in facilitating IDA start-ups in community organizations and state IDA networks.
To date, CSD has distributed over 120 copies of MIS IDA nationwide.  Many of these are being
used to manage multiple IDA programs, including five statewide IDA networks.  The success of
MIS IDA is reflected in the fact that the Federal Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) being
implemented by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) stipulate the use of MIS
IDA or comparable software.
Experimental design survey.  The experimental design survey is being conducted at CAPTC,
with data collection by Abt Associates, using a questionnaire that was developed by CSD over
several years.  Data collection for wave one began in October 1998 and was completed in Fall
1999.  Wave 2 will begin in October 2000.
In-depth interviews.  In-depth interviews will occur in 2000 with a purposeful subsample of the
experimental survey sample.  A preliminary instrument for in-depth interviews has been
designed at CSD by Dr. Margaret Sherraden and during the coming year it will be refined and
pre-tested.  We have consulted with Dr. Kathy Edin, a member of the Evaluation Advisory
Committee, in design of this part of the evaluation.  The original plan was to carry out in-depth
interviews in years two and four, but CSD has decided to move this component of the evaluation
to years three and five (when the fixed-format survey will not be occurring).
Assessment of community-level effects.  Community-level evaluation requires a concentration
of IDAs within an identified geographical area because unless IDAs reach a certain
concentration, we would anticipate no measurable community-level effects.  Because no
appropriate site for this evaluation exists within ADD, we are have looked elsewhere.  The
Atlanta United Way is using IDAs for homeownership as a neighborhood-revitalization strategy,
concentrating on specific neighborhoods.  Following a year of discussion with Martha Taylor
Greenway of the Atlanta United Way, we completed an agreement regarding a community-level
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evaluation at that site.  An evaluation team has been formed, led by Dr. James Emshoff, a
researcher at Georgia State University, with other researchers from Emory University and The
Atlanta Project.  Team members have prior experience with community-level evaluation.  CSD
has contracted with Atlanta United Way to support a portion of the costs.  Support will also come
from Annie E. Casey Foundation neighborhood research funds.
Return on human investment analysis.  A framework and design for the ROHI is being
completed by Drs. Shirley Porterfield and Mark Schreiner at CSD, so that we know what
program-cost information we need to collect in MIS IDA and what data on participant costs and
outcomes we need to measure in the experimental design survey.  These data will be collected
during the demonstration, but the analysis and report will not take place until the fifth year of
ADD.  At the meeting of the Evaluation Advisory Committee in March 1999, discussion pointed
to the importance of getting good cost data from the programs.  CSD will design additional
measures for collection of cost data from all IDA programs.
Brief survey.  Wave two data from the experimental design survey (which will give some idea
of how IDA participants are doing compared to controls) will not be collected until year four of
ADD (2001), and this is a long time to wait for impact data.  As an interim measure, CSD is
undertaking a limited cross-sectional survey of IDA participants who are not at the large site.
This brief or “snap shot” survey asks participants about their IDAs, saving behavior, and effects
of asset accumulation.  Esther Cho, Sandy Beverly, and Michael Sherraden of CSD have
prepared and revised the instrument for this survey; it was pre-tested in May 1999 at one IDA
program, and is now being administered at seven other IDA programs by Amanda Moore and
Margaret Lombe.  At this writing, the data are almost in for about 400 IDA participants.  The
report from the brief survey will be out in Spring 2000.  It will offer useful and interesting
glimpses on how IDA participants save (consumption efficiency is a strong theme) and how
IDAs affect participants and their families.
Participant case studies.  Case studies are similar to in-depth interviews, but they are much
more extensive.  Case studies are extended interviews, seeking a more extended biography of the
IDA participant and of the ways in which IDAs have affected the person’s life.  Furthermore, we
can follow cases by re-interviewing at a later date.  Both successful and unsuccessful IDA
participants are being interviewed.  One of the purposes of the case studies is to have examples
that can be interwoven into a future book on the ADD evaluation, to detail and bring to life the
quantitative data.  Dr. Margaret Sherraden of the University of Missouri, Karen Edwards and
Freda Bady of CSD, and graduate students Courtney Everson and Philip Hong have conducted
multiple interviews with sixteen participants at several of the IDA programs (in rural Vermont,
Washington, DC, Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco).
Evaluation on Course, Impact on Policy Innovation
CSD’s working relationship with CFED and the 13 sponsoring organizations in ADD remains
very positive.  There have been many times when program and evaluation interests conflict, and
we have always been able to work these out.  Whenever CSD needs to do something for
evaluation, CFED and the IDA programs sponsors have gone the extra mile to make it possible.
The commitment to getting good evaluation data, on everyone’s part, could not be stronger.
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All components of the ADD evaluation are moving ahead successfully.  The ADD evaluation is
among the most data-rich policy demonstrations, and quite likely there will be large payoffs for
this effort.
Indeed, we have already seen these payoffs in ADD’s influence in federal policy-making.  For
example, as the Department of Treasury (DOT) designed President Clinton’s 1999 proposal for
Universal Savings Accounts (USAs), DOT staff called CSD many times with specific requests
for data on savings patterns in ADD.  That we had these data available, demonstrating that low-
income households can save, considerably influenced the USA proposal.  CSD is pleased to
report that this is one instance when research results directly affected a major policy proposal.
Promoting IDA Evaluations beyond ADD
Many other IDA programs are beginning to think about evaluation using CSD materials or
technical assistance.  As an early strategy for building evaluation capacity, CSD distributed
copies of the IDA Evaluation Handbook (1995) on request to over 200 local programs and state
governments, and many more copies of the Handbook were downloaded from CSD’s
webprogram.
Another major CSD initiative is conducting training and supporting the widespread use of MIS
IDA.  In addition to facilitating IDA program development and administration, MIS IDA creates
a database on program features, participant characteristics, savings amounts and patterns, and
uses of IDAs.  This database can then be sent to a central location and merged with other IDA
programs databases for analysis.
Center for Social Development
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Appendix C
ADD Evaluation Advisory Committee
Ms. Margaret Clark, Director the Self-Employment Learning Project at the Aspen Institute, an
award-winning study of the effects of microenterprise programs.
Dr. Claudia Coulton, Director of the Center on Urban Poverty and Social Change at Case
Western Reserve University, investigator in numerous studies of urban poverty and community
development.
Dr. Kathryn Edin, Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, specialist in
qualitative methods in studying low-income households, author of There’s a Whole Lot of Month
Left at the End of the Money.
Dr. John Else, Founder and Chair of the Board of the Institute for Social and Economic
Development (ISED), and Director of ISED East, experienced in evaluation and monitoring of
microenterprise and other economic-development strategies.
Mr. Robert Friedman (liaison from IDA demonstration), Founder and Chair of the Board of
the Corporation for Enterprise Development, director of the ADD demonstration, author of The
Safety Net As Ladder.
Dr. Irving Garfinkel, School of Social Work, Columbia University, researcher in poverty and
inequality, policy innovator and evaluator of child-support payments.
Dr. Karen Holden, La Follette Institute of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin, author of
numerous studies of household economics and gender.
Dr. Laurence Kotlikoff, Department of Economics, Boston University, expert on
intergenerational transfers, savings, and public policy, author of What Determines Savings.
Dr. Robert Plotnick, Department of Public Affairs, University of Washington, author of several
important studies on poverty and inequality, professor in public affairs and social work.
Dr. Salome Raheim, Dean of the School of Social Work, University of Iowa, researcher on
Self-Employment Learning Project (evaluation of microenterprise), and author of numerous
papers on microenterprise.
Dr. Marguerite Robinson, Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard
University, expert on design and evaluation of development finance institutions and savings in
poor households.
Dr. Clemente Ruiz Duran, Director of Post-Graduate Program in Political Economy, expert in
small-scale savings and asset-based policy in Latin America and East Asia, author of more than a
dozen books on economic development and social policy.
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Dr. Thomas Shapiro, Department of Sociology, Northeastern University, expert on assets and
race, co-author of Black Wealth/White Wealth.
Dr. Michael Sherraden (convenor), Director of the Center for Social Development,
Washington University, author of Assets and the Poor, director of ADD evaluation.
Center for Social Development
Washington University
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Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis
The Center for Social Development is part of the George Warren Brown School of Social Work
at Washington University in St. Louis.  Washington University is a research institution of
national and international standing, with excellence in many schools and departments.  The
School of Medicine and Department of Biology are particularly strong, and Washington
University is at the forefront in many areas of biomedical research.
The George Warren Brown School of Social Work (GWB) is consistently ranked among the top
schools of social work in the United States.  In the latest ranking by US News and World Report,
GWB was tied for first as best school of social work in the country.  GWB is known for its
strong emphasis on academic quality and the research productivity of its faculty.  The Doctoral
Program at GWB is highly regarded for advanced training in quantitative data analysis.  Also at
GWB are the Center for Mental Health Services Research, the first such center in a school of
social work in the country, funded by the National Institute of Mental Health to undertake studies
of mental-health services; and the Buder Center for American Indian Studies, which is unique as
the only social work research and teaching center focusing on American Indians.
The Center for Social Development (CSD) began in 1994 with Michael Sherraden as the
founding director.  Although relatively new, CSD has established itself as a leading academic
center in social development.  Social development refers to focusing on a wide range of
capacities of individuals, families, and communities, as opposed to a more traditional social
services focus on problem-solving and maintenance.  CSD has a multipurpose agenda
encompassing social theory, research, policy innovation, projects in the community, and
teaching.  CSD projects connect academic and applied interests and build bridges across public,
non-profit, and private sectors.  Both academic excellence and real-world impact are
emphasized.  CSD publishes a working paper series and occasional policy reports, and co-
sponsors an interdisciplinary Seminar on Work, Families, and Public Policy at Washington
University.  Substantively, CSD’s work has focused in the following areas: (1) building assets of
individuals and families so that they can invest in life goals such as homes, education, and
enterprise development; (2) investing in people to increase participation in the economy and
involvement in society; (3) promoting strong communities, active citizenship, mutuality, and
interracial harmony; and (4) creating responsive and effective human-service and community-
development organizations.
 
CSD is a hub of theory and research on asset-based domestic policy, i.e., strategies that promote
saving and investment (in contrast to income and consumption).  CSD’s work has focused
particularly on impoverished populations, designing and testing matched savings in the form of
individual development accounts (IDAs).  CSD plays a leading role in designing and carrying
out evaluations of IDA programs.  In applied work, CSD works closely with the Corporation for
Enterprise Development (CFED) and has helped write IDA legislation at federal and state levels,
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assisted with IDA program implementation in dozens of communities, and contributed to the
development of President Clinton’s 1999 proposal for Universal Savings Accounts (USAs).
In related work, CSD is currently undertaking studies of poverty, income, and assets using
existing data sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Survey of
Families and Households.  CSD has contracted with The Aspen Institute to carry out in-depth
interviews for Wave Four of the Self-Employment Learning Project (a study of low-income
entrepreneurs) which is currently in the writing phase.  The CLASS Project (a study of
adolescent motivations and educational success in an urban high school), with funding by the
National Institute of Maternal and Child Health, is also at CSD.  A study of welfare reform in
rural areas is funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  CSD has also designed a graduate
training program in Urban Family and Community Development, which is funded by the
Danforth Foundation and the State of Missouri.  In a December 1998 initiative, CSD hosted a
multidisciplinary conference of top gerontologists to specify theoretical perspectives and develop
a research agenda in “productive aging”; this conference was supported by the National Institute
on Aging.  Work on youth service is being planned for 2000.
For more information on CSD’s work, contact the Center for Social Development, Campus Box
1196, Washington University, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, Missouri 63130;
tel 314-935-7433; email csd@gwbmail.wustl.edu;
homepage http://gwbweb.wustl.edu/Users/csd/.
